Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Western Evangelical Seminary Theses

Western Evangelical Seminary

5-1982

Soren Kierkegaard: The Meaning of Existence and the Nature of
Truth
Murray William Swalm

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/wes_theses
Part of the Christianity Commons

s¢REN KIERKEGAARD:

THE MEANING

OF EXISTENCE AND THE
NATURE OF TRUTH

A Graduate Research Paper
Presented to
the Faculty of
Western Evangelical Seminary

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Divinity

by

Murray Willard Swalm
May 1982

Approved by
c:.

Advisor:

~

J1rf-t~ t - ~<.-.£
/.

I

L/

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Chapter
1.

2.

3.

INTRODUCTION
Justification of Study
Method of Procedure
Limitations of Study
Design of Study
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Copenhagen
The Church
The Father
Education
Kierkegaard's Vocation
The Individual
The Individual Christian
The Individual Christian as Witness
Regine Olsen
The Corsair
The Attack Upon Christendom
THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL AND THE
MEANING OF HIS EXISTENCE
First Synthesis- Body, Soul, Spirit
Second Synthesis - The Tempora 1 and Eterna 1
Existence
Existence - Spheres - The Dialectic of
Inwardness
Aesthetic Sphere
Transition of Spheres
Ethical Sphere
iii

1

2
3
4

4

6
7
8
8
12
12
13

16
17
18

20

22

25
27
29

32
34
35

38

40

Chapter

Page
The Religious Sphere
Religiousness A and B

44
57

4.

TRUTH IS SUBJECTIVITY
Objective/Subjective
Passion
Faith
Truth is Subjectivity: The Essence

64
64
71
73
80

5.

CONCLUSION

87

S~ren

Kierkegaard: The Father of
Existentialism

Yes
No

87
89
93

BIBLIOGRAPHY

98

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This writer was appreciative of the a1truism expressed by
several people in their contribution towards this effort.
l.

To Lorrie, a wife who tolerated my whims and happily

encouraged my dreams, this work is dedicated.
2.

To Dr. Nobel

v.

Sack who unselfishly gave himself to his

students.
3.

To Darlene Adolf for her excellent typing of this paper.

v

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The meaning of existence and the nature of truth were central
to Ki erkegaardi an thought.

Any discussion of Ki erkegaard' s thought

would include various aspects of these themes.

In every matter,

whether it be Kierkegaard's ethics, the nature of the individual, the
religious life, we are forced to consider these themes.
In modern times existentialism has became popular.

Yet the

existentialism of Kierkegaard, the call to a difficult but ultimately
rewarding life as an individual Christian, is not popular.

Such a

philosophy is not part of the contemporary "good-life Christianity"
so commonly promoted.

The camp 1acency of the nineteenth century

church has fallen again upon the twentieth century church.
Ki erkegaard searched for meaning in existence and found it
rested in becoming involved with one's own existence.

Christianity,

subjectively understood and existentially appropriated, supplied the
existing believer with a focus for his existence.

Appropriation must

be a decision made by a solitary individual willing to give himself
completely to the task of becoming.

It was within this

process of

becoming that truth became known subjectively through the passion of
inwardness.

1.

2.
Justification of Study
The fact that man needed to hear a message of cha 11 enge to
become a Christi an was good reason for such a study.

S0ren Ki er-

kegaard gave his life to delivering such a challenge.

The need to

hear such a challenge in Kierkegaard•s own inimitable way still
remains.
The understanding of how Kierkegaard viewed existence and
truth were foundation a1 to a more comp 1ete understanding of Ki erkegaard.

The meaning of existence cannot be determined outside of

existence, thus Ki erkegaard 1ooked to his own existence to discover
the road to meaning.

An existential analysis was unique, for it re-

quired the individual to look to his own existing circumstance rather
than step outside and use speculative and abstract systems to measure
one•s own existence.

It was within this existence that one could find

meaning for his existence and realize the truth by which his existence
would be governed.

Therefore existence and truth were the bedrock

of Ki erkegaardi an thought and offered the opportunity of essent i a1
understanding.· The final result was not to draw one into the belief•s
of a new system but to st i mu 1ate one into the rea 1i zat ion of a
meaningful existence.

The serious reader of Kierkegaard needs to come

to an understanding of Kierkegaardian existence and truth.
kegaard would stimulate the same individual
becoming whereby existence will

Kier-

into the process of

become meaningful

and truth will

become evident.
Phi 1osophy should be concerned with making man •s existence

3.
more meaningful.

Philosophy, as a discipline, is a task by which man

can more clearly perceive his existential situation.
know where we are, we cannot chart a course.

If we do

not

Kierkegaard has provided

us with a process by which we may discover where we are.

He felt

obligated to act as a midwife, bringing to birth our own innate ideas.
We could find what we ought to be and what we ought to do, within ourselves.

The study of.Kierkegaard brought about understanding of Kier-

kegaardian existence and truth and one's own existence.
Method of Procedure
This study was largely descriptive in nature.
duction
thought.

to

two

fundamental

elements

within

S0ren

It gave introKierkegaard's

Of utmost importance was S0ren Ki erkegaard' s own thought

as opposed to a discussion of the merits of his views.

The primary

focus was upon the nature of man and the meaning of his existence
which culminated in S.K.'s expression. "truth is subjectivity."

The

existential nature of S.K. 's thought required brief biographical references which are reflected in the deve 1oping concepts.

The study

did not follow a particular historical outline but reflected several
period's of S.K.'s life.

The design of the study focused upon the

centra 1 themes of existence· and truth and fo 11 owed a 1ogi ca 1 conceptual pattern rather than a historical sequence.
Throughout the study S.K. has been allowed to speak for himself, without commentary.

The debates and views of S.K.'s opponents

were set aside so that the heart of S.K. 's message may be more clearly
seen.

While the study of S.K. 's reason for certain concepts and

4.

thoughts has occupied others, there was 1itt 1e attempt to show the
roots of S. K. 's thought.

We were not concerned with the "whence" but

with the "what" and "why" of Kierkegaard's thought.
Limitations of Study
The study was limited by the selective nature of the study.
Ki erkegaard' s thought· was permeated with existent i a 1 e 1ements, but
reflected a diversity of concerns.

This study concentrated upon those

works which spoke most directly to his existential view.

Two fund-

amental areas of thought were arbitrarily selected from the whole of
his work for closer scrutiny.

Therefore the study was limited by its'

inability to encompass the whole of S.K.'s thought, which would have
been more true to Ki erkegaard, but much beyond the scope of this
study.
Design of Study
The design of this study followed something of the logical
development of concepts as observed within S.K. 's works.
chapter

provided

a brief

biographical

historical context from which he spoke.

sketch

and

The second

laid

out the

This chapter permitted the

reader to see some of the why of Kierkegarrd's thought.

The meaning

of existence and the nature of man were the themes of the third
chapter.

The stages of 1i fe provided the framework by which the

chapter was built.

Included were Kierkegaard's ethical view and the

place of aesthetics in existence.
pivotal

thesis,

Chapter four gave voice to S.K.'s

"truth is subjectivity."

Here the pri nc i p1es of

5.

existence and the

nature of man were

applied

and

illustrated.

Theological considerations such as faith, sin, passion and God were
reflected upon.

Chapter five closed the study with some final remarks

concerning

Kierkegaard•s contribution to contemporary thought and

theo 1ogy.

Some observations regarding Ki erkegaard •s thought c 1osed

the study.

CHAPTER TWO
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Sl!lren Ki erkegaard, the 1ast of seven chi 1dren, was born to
Ann and Michael Kierkegaard 1 on May 5, 1813. 2 The family resided in
Copenhagen

Denmark, where Sl!lren lived, did the bulk of his work and

where he died.

Sl!lren Ki erkegaard evidently 1oved Copenhagen because
he rarely left it. 3 Here he found his inspiration for writing, suf-

fered his pain and humiliation and began his attack upon established
Christianity.

He

loved

his

country and his native tongue and

exercised the utmost care in his use of it.
Expressing thanks for the sympathy and good will as have
been showed me, I could wish that I might, as it were, present
these works {as I now take the liberty of doing) and commend
them to the nation whose 1anguage I am proud to have the
honor of writing, feeling for it a filial devotion and an
almost womanly tenderness, yet comforting myself also with
the thought th~t it wi 11 not be disgraced for the fact that
I have used it.

1Walter Lowrie, A Short Life Of Kierkegaard {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), p. 22.
2 Ibid., p. 3.
3Ibid., p. 15.
4 Ibid, p. 14.
For a fuller appreciation of Sl!lren Kierkegaard's love for country and language, see pp. 9-16.

6.

7.
A.

Copenhagen
The Copenhagen of the early 1800 s was a city of about two1

hundred thousand inhabitants.

It was the capital of the little land

and the cultural center of Denmark. 5

Here

came

all

the

prominent

artistic and 1i terary figures of Denmark, of which many figured in
the life of S0ren Kierkegaard. 6
Copenhagen was a quiet 1itt 1e town that st i 11 offered the
benefits of a 1arge city.

It had not yet been struck by the in-

dustrial revolution and would not be until two years after S0ren Kierkegaard 1 s death. 7 Thus it was an o1d society, one that as yet had
not been uprooted by the mood of change characterized by industrialism.

The society was conservative and traditional with its Guild
8
system and Absolutism.
S0ren Kierkegaard said the year in which he was born was "the

year in which so many

another bad note was put into circulation." 9

It was the year of national bankruptcy after a six year war with
England as an ally of Napoleon.

Kierkegaard 1 S life spanned one of

5
E.J. Carnell, The Burden of S0ren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1965), p. 25.
6Lowrie, op cit., pp. 3-5.
7Frederich Sontag, A Kierkegaard Handbook (Atlanta: John Knox
Press, 1979), p. 1.
8 Ibid., p. 1.
9

rbid.' p. 1.

8.

the poorest periods in Danish history. 10
B.

The Church
S0ren Ki erkegaard be 1onged to the Lutheran church of Denmark.

This church was the state church into which one was born.

No personal

commitment needed to be made to the faith, yet one could claim faith.
The c1ergy had so 1d themse 1ves to the
an inextricable part of it.

11

system" and indeed had become

They no longer were the clergy separated

unto God but rather to State Christianity.
Ki erkegaard •s po 1emi cs thundered out against the comp 1acency
he found in the church.

He saw the figures he respected (Mynster)

not only representing this complacency but perpetuating it with their
messages and their 1i ves.

The message, as he saw it, promoted not

the individual commitment to a difficult life with Christ as demonstrated by the gospels, but a complacent and placid trip along the
open road of ease in State religion. 11
C.

The Father

S0ren Kierkegaard•s relationship with his father was one of
strained intimacy. 12 Michael Kierkegaard was a man of unusual wealth

10

Ibid., p. 1.

11 Peter P. Rohde,
S0ren Kierkegaard: The Father of Existentialsim," Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis:
A comtemporary of S0ren Kierkegaard,
Burgess Pub. Co., 1969), p. 29.
N.F.S. Grundtvig, promoted existential thought but emphasized fellowship in a Christian sense. S0ren Kierkegaard grudgingly recognized
him as a religious genius but remained in opposition to his denigration of the individual as S0ren Kierkegaard saw it.
12 Ibid., pp. 45-51.
11

9.

by virtue of the inheritance of his uncle's textile business.

Michael

had suffered deep physical and emotional pain as a child because of
the harsh environment in which he was born.

One night as a young

shepherd boy he turned in des per at ion and cursed God.

From that time

forward a strange brooding and melancholy settled upon him because
he felt he had committed the unpardonable sin. 13

This guilt and sor-

row was carried.heavily by the father until his death was subliminally
implanted in his sons. 14
In 1797 Michael Kierkegaard remarried after the death of his
first wife, who bore him no children.

His second wife he felt re-

quired to marry as she bore him a daughter only four months after
their marriage.

She had been a house-servant and Michael's indiscretion now added another sin to the heavy guilt he already bore. 15
Between the years 1832 and 1834 severe calamities befell the
family.

In the space of these years the mother and five of the

seven

children died leaving only the old man, S0ren and his older brother
Peter to carry on. 16

These events produced a great de a1 of anxiety

and despair within the father.

Thus the old man was religiously

severe and his deep melancholy infected his two remaining sons. 17

13

Elmer H. Duncan, S0ren Kierkegaard (Waco, Texas: Word Books,

1976) ' pp. 17-18.
14

Ibid., p. 18.

15

Ibid., p. 18.

16 L

·
owne,
op. c1't . , pp. 64 - 65 .

17

carnell, op. cit., p. 17.

10.
The father exerted a strong and lifelong influence over
to whom

S~ren

fe 1t a rea 1 indebtedness.

beginning, to my father.

S~ren

"I owe everything, from the

When melancholy as he was, he saw me mel-

ancholy, his prayer to me was:

Be sure that you really love Jesus

Christ!" 18
We can begin to appreciate the melancholy, gloomy

S~ren

as

we read his writings.

The development of his concept of anxiety and
despair came largely out of his background. 19 As Kierkegaard perceived
it, "a son is like a mirror in which the father beholds himself, and

for the son

the father too is like a mirror in which he beholds himself in the time to come." 20
In the later days of the Father's life (probably around

S~ren

Kierkegaard's 22nd. birthday) a serious break came into the Father/Son
re 1ati onshi p.

S~ren

Ki erkegaard had become uneasy about his father's

faith and his father revealed his own sin of sensuality.

He confessed

the premartial relations he had with S~ren Kierkegaard's mother. 21
For

S~ren

Ki erkegaard this event became the "great earthquake" to

which he refers throughout his writing.

It was because of this event

that S.K. went down the road of "perdition" for a time.

18 Ibid., p-. 17.
19 Ibid.
20

s~ren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way trans. Walter Lowrie,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 192.
21 Rohde, op. cit., p. 1.

11.

Reconciliation between the two took place on S0ren Ki erkegaard's twenty-fifth birthday,
and "secret."
his son.

when the father confessed his guilt

The so called "unpardonable sin," was now revealed to

This confession caused the reconciliation to take place as

S¢ren Kierkegaard realized the cost to his father of such an intimate
reve 1at ion. 22 A short whi 1e 1ater S0ren Ki erkegaard' s father died.
S0ren remarked in his journal:
My father died on Thursday, .the eighth (1838), at two
o'clock in the night. I had so heartily wished that he might
live a few years 1onger, and I regard his death as the last
sacrifice his love for me occasioned; for not only has he died
from me but died for me~ in order that if possible something
may be made of me still. 3
We can see the influence of the father upon S0ren Kierkegaard.
However, we must be careful not to suggest that S0ren's character was
fixed.

There is no doubt that inheritance and environment had a

prodigious influence upon his 1i fe, but his own philosophy rejects
the "fixing of fate." 24
S0ren Kierkegaard attained an understanding of himself
by reviewing his life from early childhood and he had an unusually vivid feeling of solidarity with "the family, the
clan, the race"; but on the other hand, the freedom and responsibility of the individual was his most ardent conviction,
and therefore he accounted "the individual higher than the
race."25

22 Howard v. Hong and Edna H. Hong ed. trans., S0ren Kierkegaards
Journals and Papers, IV (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978),
p. 122.
23 L

.
owne,
op. c1't . , p. 120 .

24 Ibid., p. 29.
25 Ibid., p. 30.

12.
D.

Education
Sl!lren Kierkegaard's education followed the usual course of

students for that day. He attended public schools from which he graduated at the age of seventeen.

He was not regarded as an exceptional

student but showed an aptitude for Latin.

Although

he was the brunt

of cruel jokes, because of his odd appearance and physical fraility,
he was very able to protect himself with a remarkable wit. 26
Upon his dismissal from preparatory school his principal wrote
that his nature was "very gay and frank."

Likely this was Sl!lren

Kierkegaard's way of concealing his melancholy as we read in his
journa 1 for the year

1837: "I am a two faced Janus: with one face
I laugh, with the other I cry." 27
In the year 1830 he entered the University in Copenhagen and

gave himself over to his studies.

He found great joy in the liberal

arts from which he had been deprived in his father's home.

He showed

real brilliance in philosophy, physics and mathematics and as a consequence was slower, than his father would have liked, in beginning
his thelogical studies. 28
It was upon the death of his father that "it became a pious

26 oavid F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (Minneapolois:
Augusburg Pub. House, 1941), pp. 6-7.
27 Hong and Hong, op. cit., v1. 5 (1978) p. 107.
28 Lowrie, op. cit., p. 58.

13.

duty" for him at least to take his theological degree, for as he said,
"You cannot dispute with a dead man." In 1840 he became a candidate
in Theo 1ogy. 29 He comp 1eted this course of study over the next two
years.

On July 16, 1841 the faculty accepted his dissertation, "The

Concept of Irony" for the master's degree. 30
S0ren Kierkegaard completed his formal education with the effectuation of his theological degree.

While he never was able to use

his theological degree as a pastor, (which he deeply desired to do)
much of his writing reflects his theological concerns as we have seen
in "Fear and Tremb 1i ng" and "The concept of Dread," and other works.
E.

Kierkegaard's Vocation
1.

The Individual
Kierkegaard's vehement protest was against Hegelianism, which

b1anketed Europe.

He spent a good de a1 of time upgrading the in-

dividual and downgrading the group or the mass which Hegel's philosophy

promoted.

While

Kierkegaard

extended great energy in

attempting to overthrow Hege 1i ani sm he st i 11 respected Hege 1' s work.
If he had written his whole logic and declared in the Preface that it was only a thought-experiment (in which, however,

29 swenson, op. cit., p. 12.
30

Walter Lowrie,

1938) Appendix III.

Kierkegaard

(London: Oxford Univ. Press,

14.

at many points he had shirked some things), he would have been
the greatest thinker that ever 1i ved.
Now he is comic. 31
It was the "system" that Hegel promoted to which S0ren Kierkegaard reacted.

For S0ren Kierkegaard existence is much too complex

for any system to encompass and any attempt to do so is comic.

To ·

fight the battle Kierkegaard directly addressed Hegel.
How frequ~ntly have I sworn that Hegel basically regards
men, paganly, as an animal-race endowed with reason. In an
animal-race 11 the single individual 11 is always lower than the
.. race... The human race a1ways has the remarkab 1e character
that, just because every individual is created in the image
of God, the 11 Single individual" is higher than the "race."
That this can be taken in vain and horribly misused, I
But this is Christianity.
And here is where the
concede.
battle must really be fought.32
Central

for Kierkegaard is the dignity of the individual.

To be an individual, to establish one's own individuality is part of
becoming a Christian.

Martin Heidegger would declare, "Authenticate

yourself," while S0ren Kierkegaard saw authenticity as being realized
through becoming an individual Christian.
For Kierkegaard the way in which one became an individual was
as important as being an individual, for everything was in process.
Ki erkegaard thus became heavily Socratic.

The Greek saying "Know

31 s0ren Kierkegaard, tJohannes
Climacus],
Concluding Unscientific Postscript trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Pr1nceton
University Press, 1941) p. 558. Here is also quoted the longest appreciative remarks Kierkegaard makes concerning Hegel.
32 Hong and Hong, op. cit., vl. 2. (1970) p. 224.

15.

Thyself" became important for him and was to be sought with all of
ones might.

What was done inwardly was infinitely more important than
that which was done outwardly. 33
The Socratic, maieutic art, was immediately claimed by Kierkegaard for his methodology.

Thus, through dialogue and indirect com-

munication one may be brought to the sameplace as Socrates, when he
declared that "he knew that he did not know: whereas others thought
they knew, but in fact didn't know." 34 It is precisely at this point
that one begins becoming

an individual,

for

now one can

learn.

Learning cannot take place if one smuggly thinks he knows. Kierkegaard
saw himself as the midwife in the process

of ideological

birth.

Socrates, 1ike Ki erkegaard, was con vi need that he would cheat others
if he did not force them to have a "stinging experience of their own
.
.,35
1gnorance.
Kierkegaard understood that his assignment was to "make people
individuals."
There cannot really be the 1east doubt that what Christianity needs is another Socrates who could existentially
express ignorance with the same cunning dialectical simplicity, or as it should be said:
I cannot understand the

33 carnell, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
34 Ibid., p. 29.
35 Ibid.

16.
the first thing about faith, but I believe. But it is all that
understanding and conceiving which is the misfortune.36
To be an individual is an arduous and demanding thing.

Kierkegaard

did not attempt to make it any easier but instead realized the responsibilities such an individual must undertake if he was to be a Christian in the true and proper sense.
2.

The Individual Christian
Kierkegaard desired to make it difficult to be a Christian.

He saw himself as a prophet, as the one who had the task of speaking
agai-nst- those of the be 1i evi ng community, those who no 1anger were
experiencing the passion of the gospel.
My purpose is to make it difficult to become a Christian, yet
not more difficult than it is, nor to make it difficult for
stupid people, and easy for clever pates, but qualitatively
difficult, and essentially difficult for every man equally,
for essentially it is equally difficult for every man to re1i nqui sh his understanding and his thinking, and to keep his
soul fixed upon the absurd; it is comparatively more difficult
for a man if he has much understanding - if we wi 11 keep in
mind that not everyone who has 1ost his understanding over
Christianity thereby proves that he has any.37
Ki erkegaard

was

determined

to

rescue

Christianity

from

triviality and make being a Christian a difficult but meaningful
thing. 38 Passion and sacrifice must replace the fashion and ceremony

36 Ibid., p. 31.
37 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 495.
38 rbid., pp. 339-340. Kierkegaard discusses his construction
of a relation between eternity and time. Christianity as a philosophi ca 1 doctrine that asks to be understood is the result not the
triviality to which it has has been reduced.

17.

so preva 1ent throughout the church.

There needed to be a shift from

the intellectual task of teaching what Christianity is, to the existential

task

responsible act.

of

proclaiming

acceptance

of

Christianity

as

a

Kierkegaard wished to help others ''make a transition .

from comp 1acency to passion ate concern, from noncha 1ance before God
to holy fear and trembling.
3.

39

The Individual Christian as Witness
The individual as a Christian must also be a witness.

A wit-

ness is one who proclaims the meaning of Christianity through acting
Christianly

in daily actions.

What is a witness?
A witness is a person who directly
demonstrates the truth of the doctrine he proclaims - directly
yes, in part by its being truth in him and blessedness, in
part by vo 1unteeri ng his persona 1 self and saying:
Now see
if you can force me to deny this doctrine.40
The activity of being a witness was the activity that all
Christians w.ere to be engaged in.
Christian.

This is the responsibility of the

Kierkegaard again remarked in his Journal:

"What I want

is to spur people on to becoming moral characters, witnesses unto the
truth, to be wi 11 i ng to suffer for the truth, and ready to give up
worldly wisdom." 41

39
40
4

carnell, op. cit., p. 37.
Hong and Hong, op. cit. , vl . IV, pp. 558-559.

\arnell, op. cit., p. 42.

18.

F.

Regine Olsen
While

S~ren

Kierkegaard was completing his theological degree

he became engaged to a "sixteen year old girl of the Copenhagen
bourgeoise ca 11 ed Regi ne 01 sen. "42 The 1ove that S~ren Ki erkegaard
felt for her was very strong, for often we see him reflect upon it
and her throughout his works.

Many of his works were stimulated by

his affection for her and were written in the form of a reply:
. d.1rec t commun1ca
. t.1on. 43
1n
Nonetheless, and because of the intense devotion

S~ren

as

Kier-

kegaard had for Regine, he felt inclined to break the engagement.
Many scholars have offered speculation concerning this event and have
been led to ask the question, "Why did

S~ren

break the engagement with

someone to whom he was apparently so devoted?"

Rather than make any

rash conjectures we shall allow Kierkegaard to speak for himself.
Immediately I assumed a relationship to the whole family.
I turned my virtuosity toward her father in particular, whom
I always had liked very much anyway.
But to the centra 1 issue: the next day I saw that I had
made a mistake. Penitent that I was, my vitae ante acta, my
melancholy - that was sufficient.
I suffered indescribably during that time. 44

42 sontag, op. cit., p. 4.
43 some examples in S~ren Kierkegaard's writings are: Either/Or,
Repetition and Fear and Trembling, pp. 89-101.
44 Hong and Hong, op, cit., vl. VI (1978), pp. 192-193.
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The engagement was broken about two months 1ater on October
11, 1841. 45 Although Kierkegaard struggled tremendously through this
time he remained firm in his conviction that he should not marry.
His soul continued to be tortured with thoughts of her.
It was his desire to make their separation easier for Regine.
To protect her reputation, he decided to act as a scoundrel in the
hopes that such behaviour would lessen her love for him 46 and convince others of his moral turpitude.
Approximately a year and half after the break with Regine on
Apri 1 16,1843, at evensong, another event occured between S0ren Ki erkegaard and Regine that gave a new direction to S0ren's life. 47
We
read in his journal:
At vespers on Easter Sunday in Frue Kirke (during Myster's
sermon) she nodded to me. I do not know if it was p1eadi ng 1y
or forgivingly, but in any case, very affectionately. I had
sat down in a p1ace apart, but she discovered it. Would to
God she had not done so. Now a year and a ha 1f of suffering
and a11 the enormous pains I took are wasted; she does not
believe that I was a deceiver, she has faith in me. What ordea 1s now 1i e ahead of her. The next wi 11 be that I am a
hypocrite. The higher we go the more dreadful it is. That
a man ~~ my inwardness, of my religiousness, could act in such
a way.

45 Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., p. 141.
46 Ibid., pp. 141-143. Lowrie presents here a good discussion
on the entire relationship between S0ren Kierkegaard and Regine.
S0ren's attempts as a scoundrel were unsuccessful, as Regine immediately saw through them. For additional explanation on S0ren's engagement breaking, see Carnell pp. 21-22 and Duncan, S0ren Kierkegaard,
pp. 22-24.
47 Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., p. 156.
48 Hong and Hong, op. cit., Vl.5, p. 229.
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Through S0ren Kierkegaard's inwardness this event became significant for him, and his ideas began to spill over in literary pro"The ideas stream down upon me - healthy, happy, plump,

duct ion.

merry, blessed children, easily brought to birth, and yet all of them
bearing the birth marks of my persona 1i ty. "49
The works were now done for Regine with whom he hoped for some
kind of platonic reunion.

These hopes were dashed when he returned

to Copenhagen from Berlin where he had been working, to discover that
Regine was engaged to one Fritz Schlege1. 50 Sometime later he again
attempted to estab 1ish a p1atonic re 1at i onshi p with Regi ne and her
new husband but was rebuffed.

Kierkegaard was now released to "seal

his engagement with God." With incredible fecundity Kierkegaard wrote
volume after volume. 51 Although his love for Regine remained strong
he was now free to do that for which he was meant.

He was free to

declare the church apostate and defend the individual in the face of
the mass.
G.

The Corsair
Ki erkegaard had intended to give up writing and seek country

living after completing his long list of Philosophical-Literary Works.

49 Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., p. 157.
50 Ibid., p. 158.
51 carnell, op. cit., p. 22.
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He was, however, an established and acclaimed author and so it could
not be.

One of his greatest admirers was a young man named Aaron

Goldschmidt who published a political journal called the Corsair.
While Sr6ren Kierkegaard regarded this publication as "gutter press,"
Goldschmidt looked up to Sr6ren Kierkegaard.

The intent of the Corsair

was to attack, from a liberal standpoint, the Autocracy, conservatism,
and anything that smacked of reaction. 52
Many prominent people of the day felt that the journal should
be confronted.

They requested Sr6ren Kierkegaard to do so as thus far

he had escaped the "acid pen" of Goldschmidt.

As soon as Sr6ren wrote

his first article in criticism of the Corsair, Goldschmidt attacked
Sr6ren in his paper, in text, as well as in caricature.
hurt Sr6ren deeply and he never fully recovered from it.

This attack
Often he suf-

fered derisive and cruel remarks because of this event as he walked
the streets of Copenhagen.
for Ki erkegaard.

The event yielded some positive results

His fee 1i ngs for the i ndi vi dua 1 and his contempt

for the masses found clear expression.
was a1ways in the minority.

Kierkegaard thought that truth

The minority was stronger than the

majority because the majority consisted of those who had no opinion
while the minority consisted of those who had an opinion.

The

strength of the majority was entirely illusory.
No one wants to be that strenuous being - the single indi vi dua 1.
But men everywhere are in the service of that

52 Rohde, op. cit., p. 22.
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deceitful substitute - a group. Let's a few of us join together, form a group - then we can surely do something This
is the most profound demoralization of the human race. 53
H.

The Attack Upon Christendom
A11 of the conflicts of thought and event in S0ren Ki er-

kegaard's life were preparing him for what would be his final text
and his strongest argument.

The genera 1 attack upon Christendom came

about as a result of S0ren Kierkegaard's reaction to two particular
individuals:

His father's pastor and now Bishop of the Church, Bishop

Mynster and Professor Martenson, a man Kierkegaard knew from his
university days, who succeeded Mynster in the Bishopric. 54
S0ren Kierkegaard respected Bishop Mynster as a Churchman and
knew him to be a man of deep piety.

Nonetheless, S0ren also realized

that Mynster was inextricably bound up with the established, institutional church and was a symbol of "state-religion" which S0ren
saw as a falsification of Christianity.
Bishop Mynster's service to Christianity is essentially,
that, through his outstanding persona 1ity, his culture, his
superiority in distinguished circles, he has created the
fashion or more solemn way of regarding Christianity as something no deep and earnest person (how flattering to the persons concerned!) could do without.
However, this service, eternally and Christianly understood, is dubious, for Christianity is something much too distinguished to need patronage.

53 Hong and Hong, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 422.

54 Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
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And yet in his earnestness there is something of a milange
- so touched, so profoundly moved by the thought of those
glorious ones - and so sensitive when it comes to the part
where this should be made earnest by minimizing oneself just
a little bit.
And yet I love Bishop Mynster; it is my only wish to do
everything to reinforce the esteem for him; for I have admired
him and, humanly speaking, do admire him; and every time I
am able to do anything for his benefit, I think of my father,
whom it pleases, I believe.55
Kierkegaard did not begin publishing his polemics until Bishop
Mynster had died and Martensen had assumed the role of Bishop.

Fol-

lowing the funeral of Mynster at which Martensen had given the eulogy;
S0ren Kierkegaard wrote his first polemic.

He chose Martensen for

the brunt of his attack because of Martensen's funeral oration over
Bishop Mynster.

Martensen called Mynster "one of the witnesses for

the truth who, 1 ike a sacred chain, stretch down the ages from the
days of the Apostle."

56

Kierkegaard could not keep his pen silent any longer.

To him

this was a terrible offence to true Christian values and so he wrote.
It was not until almost a year later that Kierkegaard's discretion
allowed him to publish this first article in the "Fatherland."

57

He

continued to publish articles of the same nature in the "Fatherland"
until he was able to publish his own little pamplet which was called
the "Instant."

55
56
57

Hong and Hong, op. cit. Vl 6, p. 15.
sontag, op. cit. , p. 10.

Lowrie, A Short Life, p. 241.
Lowrie describes in detail
the reasons why S~ren Kierkegaard did not publish immediately.
He
also outlines the reactions of the public and other points of interest.
The "Fatherland" was the local newspaper.
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The gist of what Sl?lren Ki erkegaard was trying to say can be
found in a separate tract he ca 11 ed "The Cry." ·His anger was with
the Church as he saw it in Denmark at the time.

He said,

Whoever thou art, whatever in other respects thy life may
be, my friend, by ceasing to take part (if ordinarily thou
doest) in the public Worship of God, as it now is (with the
claim that it is the Christianity of the New Testament), thou
hast constantly one guilt the less, and that a great one: Thou
doest
not take part in treating God as a fool by calling
that the Christianity of the New Testament which is not the
Christianity of the New Testament.58
Kierkegaard's

little pamphlet the "Instant" became a good

success and a 11 owed him to become popular once again in the eyes of
the pub 1i c.

He produced sever a 1 editions of the magazine and was

furiously working on his last when he collapsed and was taken to the
hospita 1.

It was 40 days 1ater

that

Sl?lren

Ki erkegaard

died

on

November 11, 1855. 59 In the words of Edward J. Carne 11, "Thus God's
faithful

hound,

heated from the chase,

lay down to his eternal

reward." 60

58 s0ren Ki erkegaard , Attack Upon Christendom trans. Walter
Lowrie (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), p. 59.
59 Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit. pp. 253-256.
60

carnell, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

CHAPTER THREE
THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL
AND THE MEANING OF HIS EXISTENCE
Kierkegaard's concept concerning the unique importance

of

the individual person was one of his most important contributions
during his mature years.

Another, equally important contribution,

was his critique of the ecclesiastical

establishment in Denmark. 1

The nature of the i ndi vi dua 1 as a category 1ay at the very heart of
Kierkegaard's

thought.

It reflected the radical

Hegelianism for which Kierkegaard strove.

departure from

It was within this category

that modern existential thought found its "raison d'etre."

For Kier-

kegaard the foundation of his entire viewpoint was "the individual
before God," 2 which he defended with all of his dialectical genius.
Kierkegaard did most of his defending and uplifting of the
individual in two major works.

The first of these works he published

1James D. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1953), p. 175. S.K. expended a good deal of energy in criticizing the ecclesiastical establishment of Denmark.
The polemics
written in this vein in his later life have been collected into one
volume called "The Attack Upon Christendom." While this critique of
Christendom was extremely important it is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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was called The Concept of Anxiety, 3 while the second was The Sickness
Unto Death which
freedom. 4

also considered the anthropological

aspects of

S. K. never intended that man should be understood in an objective or ontological manner.

Instead he asked that man be interpreted functionally or existentially. 5 He set out to do this by
placing man in a synthesis. 6 Kierkegaard made clear what he meant by
such a synthesis.
That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which
everything turns. Man is a synthesis of the psychical and
the physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two
are not united in a third. This third is spirit.?
There appeared to be an attempt by S. K. to convert Hege 1ian
terms and concepts into existential acceptability.

When positing the

tripartite theory of three simultaneous elements in man, Kierkegaard
moved from Hegel when he suggested that spirit is not merely the third

3Modern scholarly op1mon seems to suggest that the title "The
Concept of Anxiety" conveys more the sense of Kierkegaard's intention
than the more traditional "The Concept of Dread," as used by Walter
Lowrie in his translation. For a discussion of both points of view
see, Rei dar Thomte, ed. trans., The Concept of Anxiety, by S~ren
Kierkegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. viixviii, and Walter Lowrie, trans., The Concept of Dread, by S~ren Kierkegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. ix-x.
4

-

Walter Lowrie, trans., The Concept of Dread, by S~ren Kierkegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. viii.
5E.J. Carnel 1, The Burden of S~ren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1965), p. 43
6Ibid . , p. 44.
7s0ren Kierkegaard, [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of
Anxiety, ed. trans. by Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton Un1vers1ty
Press, 1980), p. 43.
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moment in the dialectic of soul, consciousness and spirit.
S.K.

proposed that Man should be defined as

11

8

Instead

a synthesis of

soul

and body supported by spirit, 11 whereupon the synthesis received the
emphasis being supported by spirit.
A.

9

First Synthesis - Body, Soul and Spirit
Kierkegaard realized that freedom was the critical distinction

between man and animal.
rect ethical choices.

10

By freedom he meant the abi 1 ity to make corS.K. did not see man as purely body.

was able to decide, able to accept or reject.

Man

The moral qualities

in Man made it possible for him to be an individual and a Christian. 11
Actually it is the conscience which constitutes a personality; personality is an individual determinatedness
confirmed by being known by God in the possibility of conscience.
The conscience may sleep, but the possibility of
it is constitutive.
Otherwise the determinateness would be
a transitory feature.
Not even the consciousness of the
determinateness, self-consciousness, is constitutive, inasmuch
as it is only the relationship in which determinateness re1ates itself to itself; whereas God's shared knowledge [Guds
Samviden] is the stabilization, the confirmation.l2
For Kierkegaard man's moral character is the work of spirit.

8
9
10

collins, op. cit., p. 205.
Ibid.
carnell, op. cit.,

P· 44.

11 Carne 11, op. cit., p. 44.
12 Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, ed. trans., Sl6ren Ki erkegaard' s Journa 1s and Papers II I {Bloomington: Indiana Um vers1 ty
Press, 1975}, p. 483.
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He saw spirit as a psychological moral entity rather than a metaphysical one. 13

Kierkegaard•s concept of spirit is not intended to

rule out the soul and body, rather it is S.K. •s intention to emphasize
the distinction between what man is, as a natural thing, and what man
makes of himself as a responsible agent.
in

a spiritual condition,

service of God or the devi1.

until
14

A man does not find himself

he has placed his powers in the

But what is the role of spirit in the

nature of man?
In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if he were
at any moment of his life merely animal, he would never become
man.
So spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming.
Inasmuch as it is now present, it is in a sense a hostile
power, for it constantly disturbs the relation between soul
and body, a relation that indeed has persistence and yet does
not have endurance, inasmuch as it first receives the 1atter
by the spirit. On the other hand, spirit is a friendly power,
since it is precisely that which constitutes the relation.
What, then, is man's relation to this ambiguous power? How
does Spirit relate itself to itself and to its conditionality?
It relates itself as anxiety.l5
Spirit, while it works through the soul, is not soul.

Spirit

makes it possible for man to experience a personal transformation
through a shift from ethical possibility to ethical being.

16

11

Thus, if

body and soul go far in explaining the descriptive essence of man,

13 collins, op. cit., p. 206.
14

Ibid.

15 s0ren Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, pp. 43-44.
16 carnell, op. cit., p. 46.
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spirit goes far in explaining the imperative essence." 17 Reinhold Niebuhr described spirit as an expression of freedom that allows man to
stand "outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the world." 18
He also made clear that man was a problem unto himself and was thus
limited by his nature.

Kierkegaard also realized this and saw that

even though man was limited by his nature, he was rationally and
spiritually free to stand outside this limitation by his ability to
imagine possibilities that terminate only in eternity. 19
B.

Second Synthesis - The Temporal and Eternal
The second synthesis is rather confusing.

No sooner did Kier-

kegaard posit the synthesis than he negated it.

For Kierkegaard

anxiety is the element by which man is driven to God.
As for the latter synthesis, it is immediately striking
that it is formed differently from the former. In the former,
the two factors are psyche and body, and spirit is the third,
yet in such a way that one can speak of a synthesis only when
spirit is posited. The latter synthesis has only two factors,
the tempora 1 and the eterna 1 . Where is the third factor?
And if there is no third factor, there really is no synthesis,
for a synthesis that is a contradiction cannot be completed
as a synthesis without a third factor, because the fact that
the synthesis is a contradiction asserts that it is not.
What, then, is the temporal?20

17 Ibid.
18Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), VI. 1, pp. 3-4.
19 carnell, op. cit., p. 47.
20

s~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, p. 85.
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Kierkegaard suggested that the second synthesis is not really
a synthesis but a new expression for the first synthesis.

Of course,

S.K. does not concern himself with the confusion this may have caused
the reader for he merely exercised the pri vi 1edge of one who interpreted man functionally and existentially rather than scientifically
. t.1Ve 1y. 21
or obJeC

The synthesis of the tempora 1 and the eterna 1 is not
another synthesis but is the expression for the first synthesis, according to which man is a synthesis of psyche and
body that is sustained by spirit. As soon as the spirit is
posited, the moment is present.
Therefore one may rightly
say reproachfully of man that he lives only in the moment,
because that comes to pass by an arbitrary abstraction.
Nature does not lie in the moment.22
Man's nature consisted of body, soul and spirit, the spirit being that
which united the body and soul.

The second synthesis merely gave ex-

pression to the first synthesis when it described man as functionally
able to unite eternity in time.

For Kierkegaard this meant that man

must be approached as a creature who has the existential
sibility tomediateeternity in time.

respon-

23

The Kierkegaardian phrase, "Truth is Subjectivity," began to
take on real meaning when the eternal was ethically perceived and thus
brought into time "whenever a concerned human being undertakes the

2 \arnell, op. cit., p. 47.
22 s0ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, p. 88-89.
23 carnell, op. cit., p. 49.

31.

task of existence so seriously that his very selfhood is at stake." 24
Kierkegaard became more pleased as

he saw the individual

pushed closer to the brink of paradox for it was here that man became
an individual and a Christian.

Anxiety and despair were necessary

ingredients to drive one towards God.

Despair and anxiety revea 1

paradox which demonstrated to man his naked need for God, driving him
towards God.
The torment of despair is precisely this, not to be able to
die . . . the hopelessness in this case is that even the last
hope, death, is not available. When death is the greatest
danger, one hopes for 1ife; but when one becomes acquainted
with an even more dreadful danger, one hopes for death. So
when the danger is so great that death has become one's hope, 25
despair is the disconsolateness of not being able to die.
But in the last resort, that is, when the point is to believe,
the only help is this, that for God all things are possible.26
The fi na 1 hope of Ki erkegaard was that man would be driven
to God.

Kierkegaard's men, however, could be utterly opposed to each

other.

The most sharply defined individuals are the sinner and the

But the saint is the richer individual because he
. t ence. 27
. d t o th e ut mos t , th e poss1. b1"1 1. t.1es of ex1s
rea 11ze

man of grace.

24 Ibid.
25 s0ren Kierkegaard, [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death
trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1941),
pp. 150-151.
26 Ibid., p. 172.
27 collins, op. cit., p. 207.

32.
Herein 1ay the fundament a1 characteristics of the nature of
Kierkegaard•s man - the possibility of being an individual Christian
standing before God, with Christ as the model individua1. 28
Only as an individual can a man ever relate himself most
truly to God, for he can best have the perception of his own
unworthiness alone; it is almost impossible to make this
really clear to another person; besides, it could easily become affected.29
C.

Existence
Kierkegaard•s concern for the individual did much for his

understanding of the nature of man.
a concern of S.K.
gredients
was to be
eternity,

of
11

The existence of man was a1so

In particular he wished to dilineate the in-

existence

for the individual.

Authentic existence 30

a living condition in which spirit, having soared to

arouses man to such a state of ethical

and passionate

decision that the atoms of eternity are mediated in time instant after
instant. 31
Every moment has infinite value for the individual in
11

time and yet ten thousand years are but a trifle, when considered in

28 collins, op. cit., p. 207.
29 Hong and Hong, op. cit., vl. II (1970), p. 405.
30

Authenti~ existence is a term used to describe the existence
of a true individual as opposed to the 11 in-authentic .. existence of
one who has not realized his individuality existentially or functionally.
Martin Hiedegger more or less popularized the terms
authentic as in authenticate youself, .. but did not share S.K.•s desire to goad people into becoming Christians or into standing before
God.
11

31 carnell, op. cit., p. 53.
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in relation to eternity. 32
Existence must encompass the full

understanding of both the

infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal.
Existence is the child that is born of the infinite and
the finite, the eternal and the temporal, and is therefore
a constant striving . . . the thinking subject is an existing
individual.
It is only systematists and objective philosophers who have ceased to be human beings, and have become
speculative philosophy in the abstract, an entity which belongs in the realm of pure being. . . . however much the
subject has the infinite within himself through being an
existing individual, he is in the process of becoming.33
Ki erkegaard cone 1uded that existence is by nature hi stori ca 1
and must be grasped by faith. 34 In this fashion S.K. dispensed with
Hegelian historical determinism and replaced it with his own concept:
"historical becoming." 35 Man was the center of history and so through
his becoming hi story likewise becomes.

Man was not merely a being

to which something from the outside affected him.

Rather he was a

being in time able to rec a 11 and ref 1ect upon the past in order to
come to a reasonable estimate of the uncertain but determinable
future. 36
Authentic existence took

p1ace when eternity and time were

32 s0ren Ki erkegaard, [Johannes Cl imacus], Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie,
Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1941), pp. 84-85.
33 Ibid., p. 85.
34 co 11 ins, op. cit. , p. 166.
Hei degger and Barth are representative of the several tendencies to which S.K. 's thought have
given rise.
35 Ibid., p. 168.

36 collins, op. cit., p. 169.
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mediated by 1ove; spirit became active through hope and the more
active spirit was, the more 1ove was rea 1i zed.

"Spirit, in other

words, fills the instant (an atom of eternity) with works of love." 37
In sum, whenever a human being rejects the responsibilities of love, he becomes spiritless; and being spiritless,
he is only a potential person, for he had failed to complete
the sythesis which forms the substance of geniune selfhood
- i.e., he has not taken seriously his God-given duty to
mediate the absolute quality of eternity in the relativity
of time. Such a human being continues to occupy space on this
planet, to be sure, but this does not make him either an individual or a Christian.
Unless spirit rises to its true
heights, potentiality does not convert to actuality.38
D.

11

Existence-spheres" - The dialectic of Inwardness
Ki erkegaard has stated that truth is subjectivity.

By this

he meant a condition of passionate, ethical inwardness which involved
the very being of the who 1e self.

Therefore the more passion ate ly
one decides to be, the more perfectly he becomes truth. 39 With these
thoughts at the fore of this thinking, Kierkegaard developed a concept
we may call the "dialectic of inwardness," whose purpose was to help

37 carnell, op. cit., p. 55.
38 Ibi d. Hei degger used the term "Dasei n" to indicate what
existence implied. The English translation may be "thereness." S.K.
used the term interest" to indicate our involvement in the objective
world
is so intimate that it cannot be regarded objectively, i.e.
disinterestedly.
Heidegger also used the term "angst" to describe
the "dread" or "anxiety" that S.K. saw as driving one toward God and
Heidegger saw as driving one towards authentic existence.
11

39 carnell, op. cit., p. 39.
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one discover his position within the "stages" 40 on life's way. 41
S.K. outlined three spheres through which one's life preceeded.
There are three existence-spheres: the aesthetic, the
ethical, the religious.
The metaphysical is abstraction,
there is no man who exists metaphysically. The metaphysical,
ontology, is but it does not exist; for when it exists it is
in the aesthetic, in the ethical, in the religious, and when
it is it is the abstraction of or the "prius" for the aesthetic, the ethical, the religious.
The ethical sphere is
only a transitional sphere, and hence its highest expression
is repentance as a negative action. The aesthetic sphere is
that of immediacy, the ethical that of requirement (and this
requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes
bankrupt), the religious sphere is that of fulfilment, but
note, not such a fulfilment as when one fills a cane or a bag
with gold, for repentance has made infinite room, and hence
the re 1i gi ous contradiction. . . . 42
1.

Aesthetic Sphere
The aesthetic sphere was stated most c 1ear 1y in "Either /Or"

originally,

and finally presented in his "Stages on Life's ·way."

S.K's other works such as the "Postscript" refine the point of view
while the "Repetitions" criticize the aesthetic way of life.
"Either/Or" came to no conclusions.

The book

The first volume dealt with the

aesthetic sphere and the second volume with the ethical sphere.

40 stages does not appear to be the best term to use here, but
S.K. does use it in the title of his book. However, a better term
and one S.K. used more frequently is "spheres" or "existence spheres."
We sha 11 use this term from here on. Duncan in his book "SI6ren Ki erkegaard,"discusses more completely the problem of the terms, pp. 29-

30.

41 carnell, op. cit., p. 56.
42 sl6ren Kierkegaard, Stages of Life's Way ed. Hilarius Bogbinder, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940),
p. 430.
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Because there was no conclusion we must assume that S.K. had some
other resolution in mind.

Of course, this came about in his religious

sphere.
The aesthetic sphere was 1arge ly characterized by p1easure.
In the diary of the seducer in Either/Or it was remarked of the
aesthetic man that "his whole life was motivated by enjoyment." 43 This
mode of existence may be said to be "psychically determined." 44

The

characteristics of such a mode were stability, order, and objectivity
and so a way of life, but it lacked the individual awareness of the
possibility of being a self. 45
For Ki erkegaard one of the greatest travesties committed by
man was committed by the aesthetic man.
in the task of living.

He has not involved himself

Inwardly and essentially he remains uncom-

mitted person because he did not have an existent i a 1 fear of the
eterna1. 46 To be an aesthetic man meant that one attempted to avoid
all suffering and all paradox and replace it with immediacy.
47
. man JUS
. t 1s;
.
he never 1s
. becom1ng,
.
aes th e t 1c

nor

does

he

An

desire

to.

4\0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or 2 vols., ed. Victor Eremite,
trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), p. 301.
44 Jerry H. Gill, "The Ethical - Religious," Essays on Kier(Mi nneapo 1is; Burgess Pub. Co., 1969),
kegaard, ed. Jerry H. Gi 11
p. 151.

45 Ibid.
46 carnell, op. c1·t . , p. 60 .
47 Ibid., p. 61.
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The aesthetic choice is either entirely immediate and to
that extent no choice, or it loses itself in the multifarious.
Thus, when a young girl follows the choice of her heart, this
choice, however beautiful it may be, is in the strictest sense
no choice, since it is entirely immediate . . . . and because
when one does not choose absolutely one chooses only for the
moment, and therefore can choose something different the next
moment.48
The critical thing that the aesthetic man did not do is make
a decision, at 1east in the strictest sense.
lowed his

The aesthetic man fo 1-

inclinations rather than weighing the possible alternatives

and making a decision between them.
continued to live statically.
already, taken immediately. 49

In this manner the aesthetic man

He existed on the basis of what he is

The choice itself is decisive for the content of the persona 1ity, through the choice the persona 1ity immerses i tse 1f
in the thing chosen,., and when it does not choose it withers
away in consumption.~O
While Kierkegaard did find the aesthetic sphere to be the
lowest expression of individual existence he did recognize it as an
essential element in existence.

Kierkegaard had learned upon leaving

his father's home to enjoy the aesthetic elements of life.

Often he

attended the opera, appreciated fully the glories of nature and many
of the pleasures the Danish culture afforded. 51 His vocation also had
48 s¢ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 171.
49 oavid F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard {Minneapolis:
Augsburg Pub. House, 1941), p. 127.
50 s¢ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 167.
51 collins, op. cit., p. 47.
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some aesthetic overtones.

He saved some of his sharpest comments for

the philosophers, the writers etc.

S.K. was able to extricate himself

from any aesthetic accusations by demonstrating that he approached his
vocation with true inwardness, addressing the problems functionally
and existentially rather than scientifically or objectively as was
52
the Hegelian approach.
The aesthetic is not evil in and of itself
until one no longer desires to "leap" into another sphere because of
despair and eternal fear, the end result of an aesthetic life style. 53
The aesthetic values were redeemable for S.K., once the claim to
absoluteness had been rejected. 54
a.

Transition

of Spheres

The transition from the aesthetic sphere to ethical sphere
was important for the individual.

The movement from the aesthetic

sphere to the ethical mode of existence placed exhausting demands upon
the individual.
To escape the pathos of the aesthetic sphere one must have
experienced the c 1eansi ng despair which accompanied the me 1ancho ly
of boredom. 55 "There comes a moment in a man's life when his immediacy

52 Paul TiHich, A Complete History of Christian Thought (New
York: Harper & Row Pub., 1968) part II, p. 169.
53 Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought (Nashville
Abingdon Press, 1975) Vol. III, p. 337.
54 collins, op. cit., p. 42.
55 carnell, op. cit., p. 65.
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is, as it were, ripened and the spirit demands a higher form in which
it will apprehend itself as spirit. 56
To pass from one sphere to the next required a 1eap.

Ki er-

kegaard seemed to imply that the leap from the aesthetical to the
ethical was not of the same significance as the movement from the
ethical to the religious.
individual.

Certainly it was not as demanding upon the

However, Kierkegaard felt that a leap was necessary to

move from the aesthetical to the ethical.
The transition from eudaemonism to the concept of duty is an
leap, or, assisted by a more and more developed understanding
of what is most prudent, is one finally supposed to go
directly over to virtue? No, there is no pain of decision
which the sensuous (the eudaemonistic), the finite (the
eudaemoni st i c) cannot endure. Man is not 1ed to do duty by
merely reflecting that it is the most prudent thing to do;
in the moment of decision reason lets go, and he either turns
back to eudaemonism or he chooses the good by a leap.57
The 1eap from one sphere to another was necessary for there
was a chasm between the two.
s 1ide into the next sphere.
cross that chasm.

One was not able to simply blend or
A radi ca 1 decision had to be made to

Kierkegaard would not allow for an easy arrival;

one must agonize with a decision to do the seemingly impossible.
(The leap) . . . is an act of isolation, which leaves it
to the individual to decide, respecting that which cannot be
thought, whether he will resolve believingly to accept it by
virtue of absurdity.58
56 s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Vol. 2, p. 193.
57 Hong and Hong, op. cit., (1975), Vol. 3, p. 19.
58 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 92.
Within
these pages S.K. spars with Less1ng, Jacobi and Mendelssohn concerning
the leap. pp. 90-97.
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We must make it c 1ear that the different stages are not entirely left behind as a result of the leaps.

Rather,

there are

aesthetic elements in one's existence even though he may live at the
ethical

level.

The primary consideration for Kierkegaard was that

one was living within a particular stage and that there was movement
directed towards the religious taking place.
the "leap" from the ethical

59

This did not mean that

to the religious put the existential

choice betwen the two, behind forever.

The three spheres of existence

remained constant possibilities. 60

2.

Ethical Sphere
Kierkegaard has already stated that man is a synthesis between

the finite and the eternal.

If this is so, then it may be said that

the aesthetic viewed himself as within the finite and the ethicist
viewed himself as within the eterna1, 61

"

. . because the ethical

is the very breath of the eternal, and constitutes even in solitude
the reconciling fellowship with all men." 62 It was this understanding

59

Robert Breta 11, ed., A Ki er kegaard Antho 1ogy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 174-175. There appears to be
some discrepancy in the various interpretations of how the different
spheres are actually related or interrelated.
The difficulty seems
not to 1i e in Ki erkegaard' s concept of the sphere but rather in his
ambiguity regarding the definition of the leap. He has left almost
all of his discussion of the leap to his journals save for a few
remarks previously referred to, in the"Postscript."
60

James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought
Macmillan Pub. Co., Inc., 1971), p. 314.
61 carnell, op. cit., p. 67.
62

s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 136.

(New York:
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of uni versa 1 ob 1i gation that caused man to enter the ethi ca 1 sphere.
A person enters the ethical stage the moment he perceives
serious re 1at ion between ( 1) the essence of self,
(2) the
necessity of moment-by-moment choosing, and
(3) a sense of
duty which is nourished by the eternal.63

To enter the ethical sphere was not to leave ones self behind.
Instead, "He does not become another man than he was before, but he
becomes himself, consciousness is unified, and he is himself ... 64 Where
the aesthete was irresponsible the ethicist became responsible.
The ethi ca 1 i ndi vi dua 1, to be sure, may venture to use
the expression that he is his own editor, but at the same time
he is fully conscious that he is responsible - responsibile
to himself personally, inasmuch as what he chooses will have
decisive influence upon him, responsible in view of the order
of tbjngs in which he lives, and responsible in the sight of
God.65
The ethicist becomes what he becomes. 6

?

The

leap to the ethical

stage was characterized by the
imperative"Choose thyself, .. that is, affirm an absolute choice. 67 He
11

who chooses himself ethically has himself as his task, and not as a
possibility merely, ..... 68 However, it was not the content of ones

63 carnel1, op. cit., p. 67.
64 s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 181.
65 Ibid., P- 264.
66 Ibid., p. 182.
67 Livingston, op. cit., p. jl4.
68 s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 262.
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choice that was significant, rather it was the fact of the choice that
had significance for the ethicist.

The correctness of such a decision

or choice was determined by the passionate inwardness or energy used
by the ethicist.
I should like to say that in making a choice it is not so much
a question of choosing the right as of the energy, the
earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses. Thereby the
persona 1i ty announces its inner i nfi ni ty, and thereby, in
turn, the persona 1i ty is con so 1i dated. Therefore, even if
a man were to choose the wrong, he will nevertheless discover,
precisely by the reason of the energy with which he chose,
that he had chosen the wrong. For the choice being made with
the whole inwardness of his personality, his nature is
purified and he himself brought into immediate relation to
the eternal Power whose omnipresence interpenetrates the whole
of existence.69
Kierkegaard felt that the "ethical demand (was) that one became infinitely interested in existing." 70 The aim of the ethical life,
therefore, was to become the truth by transforming oneself. 71 The concern of the ethicist no longer was centered in his own personal enjoyment.

Rather:
The ethical is concerned with particular human beings,
and with each and every one of them by himself. If God knows
how many hairs there are on a man's head, the ethi ca 1 knows
how many human beings there are; and its enumeration is not
in the interest of a total sum, but for the sake of each individual, and when it judges, it judges each individual by
himself; only a tyrant or an impotent man is content to

69
70

s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. ~, p. 171.
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 280.

71 L.1v1ngston,
.
.
op. c1t.,
p. 715.
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decimate.
The ethical
lays hold of each individual and
demands that he refrain from all contemplation, especially
of humanity and the world; for the ethical, as being the internal, cannot be observed by an outsider. It can be realized
only by the individual subject, who alone can know what it
is that moves within him.72
Therefore,

the ethical

sphere,

unlike the aesthetic,

involved the

recognition that other lives also have a claim upon one's life. 73
S.K. regarded the ethical life with real esteem.

It was the

sphere in which many peop 1e 1i ved; they were good citizens, good
parents, responsible employees, and the only basis upon which society
was possible. 74
Kierkegaard has defined the ethical "as duty, and duty in turn
is defined as congeries of particular propositions, "
that the ethicist do his duty.

75

thus demanding

The ethicist has responded to the call

but found he was unable to do his duty because:
Ethics is still an ideal science, and not only in the
sense that every science is ideal. Ethics proposes to bring
ide a 1ity into actua 1 ity.
On the other hand, it is not the
nature of its movement to raise actuality up into ideality.
Ethics points to ide a 1i ty as a task and assumes that every
man possesses the requisite conditions. Thus ethics develops
a contradiction, inasmuch as it makes clear both the difficulty and the impossibility.
What is said of the law is
also true of ethics:
it is a disciplinarian that demands
and by its demands only judges but does not bring forth life.76

72 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 284.
73

Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 338.

74 Ibid.

75 s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., vl. II, p. 258.
76 s0ren Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, op. cit., p. 16.
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As in the aesthetic sphere the ethicist was confronted by anxiety and
despair at his inability to do that to which he had committed his
1ife.

"A spiritually honest person wi 11 forthrightly acknowledge that

the self has failed to close the gap between what it is and what it
ought to be." 77 Only in the sphere of the religious can the ethicist
be a "becoming Christian."

The ethicist takes the leap of faith out

of the ethi ca 1 "when one perceives the ethi ca 1 no 1onger as one's
guide for action, but as the temptation to trust in one's moral
rectitude rather than in God - or in universal principles rather than
in individual vocation." 78
3.

Religious Sphere
The re 1i gi ous sphere was the result of the norma 1 ascension

of a striving existing individual.
The normal life movement for an existing individual is
from the esthetic, through the ethical to the religious. But
this movement is not completed once for all, since existence
poses the task of its incessent renewal. The existing thinker
has esthetic passion enough to give his life content, ethical
enthusiasm enough to regulate it, dialectic enough to interpentrate it with thought. The esthetic is the raw materia 1;
the ethi ca 1 posits the requirement and constitutes the pri nciple of regulation; the religious is the fulfillment, but
again not once for all, but as renewal reinstatement, and
impulsive energy for the forward movement of existence.79

77 carnell, op. cit., p. 70.
78 Gonzales, op. cit., p. 338.
79 oavid F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (Minneapolis:
Augsburg, Pub. House, 1941), p. 77.
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The religious sphere went beyond the aesthetic and the ethica1,
was exposed in relation to that which interests us infinitely.
tween the ethi ca 1 and re 1i gi ous there was no continuity, 82
a dreadful

gap crossable only by a leap of faith.

80

81

but

and
Be-

rather

The religious

sphere was ruled by absolute rules whereas the ethical by the universa 1.

The person who lived at the re 1i gi ous 1eve 1 knew that God

was above his commands, that God gave the commands but was above them.
Therefore, faith in God for the religious man was critical.

Faith

in God meant that the religious man was willing to risk all for the
sake of God.

The universal

laws were generally binding, but the

absolute grasped the individual in a unique concrete situation and
there made its singular demand.
above his own law.

The religious man knew that God stood

Forgiveness of sin became the theological element

in the third sphere. 83
Faith is related directly to God, and not to his law.
For this reason, the ethical person knows of the commandments
of God, but not of his forgiveness.
The religious person,
on the other hand, knows both that God commands and that God
forgives.
Whereas the ethi ca 1 person 1i ves in despair and
knows nothing but good and evil, the religious holds to faith
which overcomes despair.
Faith is indeed the opposite of
despair, and therefore the only real sin is despair.84

80

The religious sphere is not the synthesis of the aesthetic
and the ethi ca 1 the way spirit is the synthesis of body and soul.
Rather the religious is a separate sphere rejecting contingency upon
the others.
81

Tillich, op. cit., p. 170.

82

Hegel's system would have offered a mediation between the
two but, of course, S.K. saw this as inconsistent with true human
existence.
83

Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 339.

84 Ibid.
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This demanded that the religious man have absolute trust in
God, which was the mark of the "Knight of Faith. "

85

Faith characterized

the life of the religious man because the Christian religion was a
religion of faith.

86

God was the object of Faith as Kierkegaard saw

it because we do not come to Him through objective knowledge but
rather He came to us through our inwardness, thus making Him an object
of Faith.

Ki erkegaard was not interested then in offering proofs for

God, for "To defend anything is always to discredit it."

87

Kierkegaard

detested the way contemporary philosophers and theologians had offered
"proofs" for God's existence.

This kind of logical exercise brought

no internal suffering but resulted in an intellectual arrogance because of their cerebral

calisthenics which

lead to scholastic re-

cognition rather than a fear of God.
So rather let us sin, sin out and out, seduce maidens,
murder men, commit highway robbery - after a 11 , that can be
repented of, and such a criminal God can still get a hold on.
But this proud superiority which has risen to such a height
scarcely can be repented of, it has a semblance of profundity
which deceives.
So rather 1et us mock God, out and out as
has been done before in the world - this is always preferable
to the disparaging air of importance with which one would
prove
God's existence.
For to prove the existence of one
who is present is the most shameless affront, since it is an

85

The "Knight of Faith" is a term coined by S.K. to describe
the epitomy of Kierkegaard's philosophy.
S.K. describes this individual thoroughly in "Fear and Trembling." Abraham emerges on these
pages as the true "Knight of Faith." S.K. never became one because
he lacked the courage. (Fear and Trembling, p. 82).
86 ouncan, op. cit., p. 75.
87
218.

s0ren

Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p.
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attempt to make him ridiculous; but unfortunately people have
no inkling of this and for sheer seriousness regard it as a
pious undertaking. But how could it occur to anybody to prove
that he exists, unless one had permitted oneself to ignore
him, and now makes the thing all the worse by proving his
existence before his very nose?88
It was S.K. 1 s contention that philosophy and religious faith were not
able to be united.

This was central to his criticism of the ration-

alistic excesses of Hegelianism that were developed by professional
.
89
sys t ema t 12ers.
Ki erkegaard fe 1t no need to defend God 1 s existence.
response to God was to be one of absolute trust or faith.

Man 1 s

This meant

for the religious man that while he was aware of the universal commands there may be particular situations that may be overcome by a
higher command given by God.

This

11

teleological suspension of the

ethical 11 by the divine was unique to the true

11

Knight of Faith 11 which

was exemplified by Abraham in relation to his son Isaac.

Kierkegaard

found the incident of Abraham about to kill his own son under the command of God, critical to his understanding of the religious, the
ethical and the
an attempt to

11

religious. 11

He wrote his

11

Fear and Trembling 11 in

answer the questions of both a theological and a

philosophical nature, raised by this incident.

88 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 485.
89 charles J. Kelly,
Essential Thinking in Kierkegaard S
Critique of Proofs for the Existence of God, 11 The Journal of Religion,
59 (April, 1979), p. 133.
See the rest of this article for an
analysis of Kierkegaard 1 S rejection of proofs for God.
It is the
author 1 S contention that Kierkegaard did not reject all proofs but
the criticism comes from the perspective of essential thinking.
11

1
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Kierkegaard stated;
If faith does not make it a holy act to be willing to murder
one's son, then let the same condemnation to be pronounced
upon Abraham as upon every other man. . . . The ethi ca 1 expression for what Abraham did is, that he would murder Isaac;
the religious expression is, that he would sacrifice Isaac;
but precisely in this contradiction consists the dread which
can well make a man sle98less, and yet Abraham is not what
he is without this dread.
There was no outward sign to indicate that one really did act under
the "teleological
dread the

suspension of the ethical" which intensified the

religious man felt when he acted.

It was precisely through

the dread that the "Knight of Faith" knew he had acted according to
faith and not on the aesthetic level.

His only recourse was to faith

-and faith was always complex or problematic.

91

"Faith

is

always

related to that which is not seen in the context of nature (physically
contracted)

to the invisible [unsynlige], in the spiritual context

(spiritually) to the improbable [usandsynlige]."

92

For

this

reason,

to be a Christian was difficult.
Anxiety,

paradox and other elements of the Christian's ex-

perience were beneficia 1 because they caused the i ndi vi dua 1 to turn
inward and through these elements realized ones need for faith which
went beyond the objective to the be 1i ef in God.

One had to be 1i eve

90 s0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, op. cit., p. 41.
91

Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 338.
S.K. suggested that the
"teleological
suspension of the ethical" was the necessary result
of heeding absolute obedience to God.
This contravened the "categori ca 1 imperative" which rose up out of the uni versa 1 as described
and established by Kant.

92 Hong and Hong, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 10.
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in God because God was an object of religious faith rather than philosophical or rationalistic apprehension.
rather than simply perceived.

God needed to be experienced

It was Kierkegaard's feeling that those

with philosophical and theological proofs for God were really interested in having the paradox eliminated and having everything
brought to a synthetic reconciliation. 93 Kierkegaard defended paradox;
One should not think slightingly of the paradoxical, for the
paradox is the source of the thinkers passion, and the thinker
without a 1;1aradox is 1ike a 1over without fee 1i ng: a paltry
mediocrity )~4
There was a right way to prove God's existence, "for one
proves his presence by an expression of submission, which may assume
various forms according to the customs of the country - and thus it
also proves God's existence by worship . . . not by proofs." 95 Kierkegaard gave no speci a1 advantage to those of great i nte 11 ectua 1
ability.

All needed to remain submissive to the paradox.

Thus, he

felt that he had made men equally able to stand before God.

To stand

before God was to stand before the absurd, that which cannot be fully
comprehended.

93 carnell, op. cit., p. 73.
94 s¢ren Kierkegaard, [Johannes Climacus], Philosophical Fragments, trans. David Swenson, Intro. and commentary by Niels Thulstup,
trans. revised and commentary translated by Howard V. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1936, 1962), p. 46.
95 s¢ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 485.
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To keep his soul fixed upon the absurd; it is comparatively
more di ffi cult for a man if he has much understanding - if
one will keep in mind that not everyone who has lost his understanding over Christianity thereby proves he has any. . . .
Every man, the wisest and the simplest, can qualitatively .
. . distinquish just as essentially between what he understands and what he does not understand . . . and he can
discover that there is something which is, in spite of the
fact that it is against his understanding and way of
thinking.96
As

an individual

moved toward Christianity the goal

kegaard set out for him was "eternal happiness."

97

This

goal,

Kierwhile

in the highest realm of the religious sphere, was to be strived for
through the transformation of the individual by pathos.

98

"In relation

to an eternal happiness as the absolute good, pathos is not a matter
of words, but of permitting this conception to transform the entire
existence of the individua1.

99

Kierkegaard proposed three conditions

for the transformation of the individual by pathos.

100

Resignation was named as the first condition.

Through re-

signationthe single individual liberatedhimself from finite goals and
confronted the eterna 1 .

"But if,

as a result of the inspection,

resignation finds nothing in the way, it is a sign that in the moment

96

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 495.

97 Ibid., p.- 323.
98

Gregor Malantschuk,
Kierkegaard's
Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 293.
99

100

Thought

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 347.
Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 293.

(Princeton:
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of inspection the individual does have a relationship to an eternal
happiness."

101

For the religious man it meant, "the dying away from

the life of immediacy while still remaining in the finite."
cannot be enough for the religious man.

102

This

He not only chooses the

absolute but inwardly appropriated the absolute as his own.

103

When the individual began to appropriate the absolute he discovered he was st i 11 bound to his re 1at i ve goa 1s.

When he tried to

extricate

became the con-

sequence

himself
and

he

from

this

rea 1i zed

his

104
.
.
f oun d a t 1on
of h.1s su ff er1ng.

immediacy,

suffering

attachment of the tempera 1 was the
The

realization

that

the

infinite

and the tempora 1 cannot be media ted was true to the i ndi vi dua 1' s
experience, but fell

short of the ideal.

This realization produced

suffering for the existing individual, and so religious suffering remained inevitable.

The inevitability of religious suffering served

as evidence to the existing i ndi vi dua 1 and to God that the self was
aware of its guilt (the result of inability to mediate the infinite
and the tempera 1)

and its determination to come to grips with

i~t. 105

101 s0ren Kierkegaard,

Postscript, op. cit., p. 354.
Resignation, while little recognized as the first conditi'on, is spoken
of by S.K. more extensively i.n his "Fear and Trembling" as "infinite
resignation" in relation to Abraham. S.K. again refers to resignation
in the Postscript but only marginally (p. 497).

102 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 386.
103Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 294.
105 carnell, op. cit.,.pp. 133-135.

104 Ibid.

Suffering, in a religious
sense, has meaning only when it is experienced in daily life. See
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 386-393.
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Resignation was the first condition of transformation, suffering the second, and guilt the third.
the

religious

sphere

because

it

was

Guilt became critical for
a

concrete

expression

existence. 106 Gui 1t was not thought of in terms of quantity,

of

(that

is, the more you are gui 1ty the more gui 1t you have) but gui 1t was
present for the individual upon the first offense, the experience of
dread.

The experience of dread was the discovery of one's gui 1t and

loss of innocence.
For human justice pronounces a life sentence only for the
third offense, but eternity pronounces sentence the first time
forever.
He is caught forever harnessed with the yoke· of
guilt, and never gets out of the harness. . . . 107
Kierkegaard saw admission of guilt as crucial to the religious
stage but felt that the admission of "essential guilt" was necessary
to bring into actuality authentic existence for the individual.

Es-

sential guilt is that guilt which one experiences and continues to
experience as the result of his realization that he was not able to
mediate the eterna 1 •

The standard by which one knew he was guilty

did not stand outside the exister {as it did in the comparative consciousness of guilt) but was within inwardness. 108

106 Ib"d
1

•'

"The consciousness

p. 76 .

107

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 475. See also
pages 471-473 for a detailed descnption of "totality - qualification"
of guilt in the religious sphere.
108

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 473.
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of guilt is the decisive expression for existential pathos in relation
to an eternal hap pi ness. ,l 09
The Kierkegaardian concept of essential guilt took one a long
way into the sphere of the religious.
the

consciousness

of

essential

However Kierkegaard felt that

guilt

still lay in immanence,

tinquishing it from the consciousness of sin.

dis-

Immanence was regarded

by Kierkegaard as an expression for Hegel's affirmation that thought
and being

are

one, that the objective was the subjective and that

thought or reason permeates all things.

For Kierkegaard, this notion

of immanence excludes all thoughts of transcendence.

110

This

concept

of immanence does not truly reflect reality, for human existence contains paradox and thought cannot penetrate paradox.

The consciousness

of essential guilt lay in immanence because while it lay in relationship to eternal

happiness it was not decisive for the individual.

Thought was able to· penetrate
standing.

e~ential

guilt and bring it into under-

Thought cannot penetrate the absurd or the paradox, there-

fore paradox is decisive for the exister.
relation

to

the

Only when the self is in

paradox/absurd can the individual

not escape the

responsibility of seeing itself in relation to God, the absolute.
That is to say, the consciousness of sin still lies essentially in immanence, in distinction from the consciousness

109
110

Ib'd
1 • ' p. 474 .

walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (London:
Press, 1938) Appendix VII -"transcendence."

Oxford

University
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of sin.
In the
consciousness of guilt it is the selfsame
subject which becomes essentially guilty by keeping guilt in
relationship to an eternal happiness, but yet the identity of
the subject is such that gui 1t does not make the subject a
new man, which is the characteristic of the breach. But the
breach, in which lies the paradoxical accentuation, cannot
occur in the relationship between an exister and the eternal,
because the eterna 1 embraces the exi ster on a 11 sides, and
therefore the disrelationship or incompatability remains
within immanence.lll
It was immanence witlrin guilt that corrupted and limited the self.
Even though the self may be fraught with guilt he was ab 1e to avoid
the responsibility of seeing itself in relation to God, the absolute.

112

Essential guilt was not decisive for the individual.
Kierkegaard felt required to fulfill his responsibility to his
vocation; that is to cause man to become an individual Christian.
Therefore he pushed man into accepting the responsibility of coming
into a re 1at ion with God the abso 1ute.
good to fulfill this mission.

He used dread, dread of the

Dread of the good was discovered in

the consciousness of the religious when the r.eligious realized it's
ethi ca 1 duty 113 was 1ove.

The self shrank from the res pons i bi 1ity

of love because love called for the "non-judgemental sharing of life
with life" which removed the self from the center.

111

112

114

The

result

of

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 474.
carnell, op. cit., p. 78.

11 \ierkegaard made use of k'antian duty in his ethical concepts to describe the obligation of the individual Christian.
114 carnell, op. cit., p. 78.
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shrinking away from the responsibility of love was dread of the good.
When dread of the good appeared in the consciousness the exister had
evidence within him that he was a sinner.

Again the religious

individual was confronted with the exhausting task of mediating the
eternal in time.
Kierkegaard has helped the existing individual realize he was
a sinner.

Sin was 1inked to two exi stenti a1 concepts:

finitude issues in moral ethical despair, and
subjectivity. 11115

( 1) that

(2) that "Truth is

Sin is this: before God, or with the conception of God,
to be in despair at not willing to be oneself, or in despair
at willing to be oneself. Thus sin is potentiated weakness
or potentiated defiance: sin is the potentiation of despair.ll6
The first concept to which sin was linked generally accompanied
flagrant transgressions of the law or universal while the second accompanied the more subtle arrogance of self-righteousness, 117 or was an
offense to the absolute.
S.K. made it clear in his little book 11 The Sickness Unto
Death" that the sickness of the sinner is despair and is "unto death."

115 Ib"d
1

116

•'

p. 79 .

s~ren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p. 208.

117 carnell, op. cit., p. 79.
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He had already stated that "despair is sin;" 118
So a 1so we can demonstrate the eterna 1 in man from the
fact that despair cannot consume his self, that this precisely
is the torment of contradiction in despair.
If there were
nothing eternal in a man, he could not despair; but if despair
could consume his self, there would still be no despair.
Thus it is that desP.air, this sickness in the self, is
the sickness unto death.ll9
The experience of despair for man was grounded in his "essential
failure to live with singleness of mind toward that which is absolute.
Relief from

despair comes

only when

the

self is so governed by

eternity that a radical transformation of the self results."

120

This

transformation took place through love.
That which really makes a man despair is not misfortune,
but it is the fact that he 1acks the eterna 1; despair is to
1ack the eterna 1; despair consists in not having undergone
the change of eternity by duty's "shalt."
Consequently
despair is not the 1oss of the be 1oved, that is misfortune,
pain, suffering; but despair is the lack of the eternal.
For when it becomes impossible to possess the beloved in the
temporal existence, then eternity says, "Thou shalt love,"
that is, eternity saves love from despairing just by making
it eternal . . . . And when eternity says, "Thou shalt love,"
then it assumes the responsibility for guaranteeing that it
can be done.l21

118

s0ren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p. 240.
Carnell in his book, Burden of S0ren Kierkegaard, recapitualtes three
elements of sin important to S.K.
1. Sin is located in a defiant
will
2.
Sin is an existence- determinant
3. The possibility
of sin increases the possibility of intellectual offence, p. 80.
119 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
120 carnell, op. cit., p. 81.
121

s0ren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. David F. Swenson
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 34-35.
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a.

Religiousness A and B

There remained one more mode of existence between the experience of despair and the "specifically Christian" religiousness
which was characterized by the paradoxical and the absurd concept of
God in time. 122 This barrier or element Kierkegaard called religiousness A while the ultimate or absolute religiousness was labeled
religiousness B.

The term immanent (A) and transcendent (B) indicated

the distinctives existant between the two different forms of the
123
. .
re l 1g1ous.
Religiousness

A was

characterized

by

immanence.

The

individual within religiousness A was "inwardly defined by selfannihilation before God," 124 and thus acknowledged his total
impotence.

The individual within religiousness A was not far from

the kingdom but he did fall short of true Christianity as exemplified
by religiousness B.
While it was possible for religiousness A to exist in paganism;
For of religiousness A one may say that, even if it has not
been exemplified in paganism, it could have been, because it
has only human nature in general as its assumption.l25

122 Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 297.
123 swenson, op. cit., p. 135.
124 s¢ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 496.
125 Ibid., p. 497.
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It is also possible for it to be the "religiousness of everyone who

is not decisively Christian, whether he be baptized or no." 126 "Religiousness A must first be present in the individual before there can
be any question of becoming aware of the dialectic of 8." 127
Reli. t.1an1. t y128
.
A was cons1. dere d as a preparatory st ep t o Ch r1s
g1ousness
(or religiousness B).
Religiousness A was dominated by the ethical-religious demands
of Christianity.

Religiousness B was "dependent upon the saving work

of Christ, offered to the person who has exhausted his own possibilities."129
The defective element in religiousness A was it's inability
to go far enough.

It remained a "heartfelt expression of a sense of
God," but was not "conditioned by a definite something." 130
Religiousness A makes the thing of existing as strenuous
as possible (outside the paradox-religious sphere), but it
does not base the relation to an eternal happiness upon one's
existence but lets the relation to an eternal happiness serve
as basis for the transformation of existence.l3l

126 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 495.
---....!..-127 Ib"d
494
1

•'

p.

.

128Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 297.
129 Ibid., p. 298.
130carnell, op. cit., p. 82.
131 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 509.
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Kierkegaard thought that Socrates' ignorance, and the Socratic
practice of gazing off into space as a form of communication with the
divine was the best example of religiousness A. 132
But how was one to bring himself to the place where he would
be ready and successful in going beyond religiousness A?

For Kier-

kegaard the answer was to be found in the bib 1i ca 1 doctrine/ account
of the incarnation.

This was evidenced in S. K. 's concept of the

paradox.

"The paradox consists principally in the fact that God, the
Eternal, came into existence in time as a particular man." 133
Kierkegaard called this paradox the "absolute paradox" because he felt
that through it, he had estab 1i shed:
tianity

(2)

(1)

the uniqueness of Chris-

the necessity of the "leap" of faith and

(3) the want

of any advantage in being rationally clever. 134
Simply stated, the absolute paradox was the fact that God
became man.

This was an impossibility yet it occurred.

132 swenson, Something

To exist

About Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 135.
Religiousness A can also be thought of as the religion of Socrates
while religiousness B as the religion of Jesus. Both are existential
in their approach to God. They both are mai euti c in methodo 1ogy and
their s i gni fi cance 1ay in their ability to do something to or bring
about transformation in persons. However Socrates assumes that truth
is present within every human being.
It is simply the duty of the
teacher (Socrates) to evoke it from man with mai eut i cs and irony.
Jesus is the only one able to transform in totality the being of
another person. God (truth) is not in man but rather comes to man
through Christ. Jesus is the teacher and Saviour who transforms man.
Tillich, op. cit,. pp. 171-172 and Livingston, op. cit., pp. 316-320.
These concepts are addressed by S.K. primarily in the Philosophical
Fragments.
133 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 529.
134

carnell, op. cit., p. 83.
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Christianity was to live in relation to the absolute paradox.
Whenever one reasons in this fashion: "One cannot stop
at the paradox because this is too small a task or too easy
and indolent," then one must reply: "No, on the contrary, it
is exactly the opposite, it is the most difficult thing of
all, day in and day out, to relate oneself to something upon
which bases one's eternal happiness, holding fast to the passion with which one understands that one cannot understand,
especially as it is so easy to let this go in the illusion
that now one has understood it. 135
Religiousness B
could acquire.

was· the greatest mode of existence the individual
Because of its transcendent nature it bound man to

it as he was no 1onger in the rea 1m of the immanent.

Although S. K.

said he never attained this level he wished it passionately for his
reader. 136
If the individual is paradoxically dialectic, every
vestige of original immanence being annihilated and all connection cut off, the individual being brought to the utmost
verge of existence, then we have the paradoxical
religiousness.
This paradoxi ca 1 inwardness is the greatest possible, for even the most paradoxical determinant, if after
all it is within immanence, leaves as it were a possibility
of escape, of a 1eapi ng away, of a retreat into the eterna 1
behind it; it is as though everything had not been staked
after a 11. But the breach makes the inwardness the greatest
possible.l37
The transition between religiousness A and religiousness B
occurred for the individual when he moved from one type of guilt consci ousness.

135

The first type of gui 1t consciousness was described in

s¢ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 496 (n.)

136

Ibid., p. 495. S.K. stated here that he felt he had only
attained the level of religiousness A but that he found this difficult
enough.
137 Ibid., p. 507.
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"The Concept of Anxiety."

This type of guilt caused the individual

to see his own possibilities in the face of the guilt of the whole
race.

The second type of guilt-consciousness was set forth in the

"Concluding Unscientific Postscript" where man saw his own impotence
in the face of the eternal ethical requirement which resulted in his
own inwardacknowledgment of his own absolute guilt. 138
To become
part of religiousness B required the single individual to "understand
what it means to break thus with the understanding and with thinking
and with immanence, in order to lose the last foothold of immanence,
eternity behind one, and to exist constantly on the extremest v·erge
of existence by virtue of the absurd." 139
When one had reached the realm of religiousness B and was
existing within it he was able to experience the expression of
authentic faith because the self passionately and existentially believed in opposition to his own understanding and thereby came into
relation with the absolute paradox. 14
Kierkegaard has made it clear

°

that once one has reached religiousness B he had not arrived but still
is constantly becoming, for the most difficult thing man could do was
to exist in relation to the absolute paradox.

It was through the
activity of existing only, that caused one to become eternal. 141

138 Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 299.
139 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 505.
140 carnell, op. cit., p. 84.
141 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 508.
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The

existence

of

the

self

within

religiousness

B was

determined by the confrontation of the self with the absolute paradox.
The possi b1il i ty of an expression of faith was

raised through the

confrontation, and the awakened self enthusiastically leaped into the
mysteries of the eternal. 142 The leap into the eternal had some risk
attached.

However, "without risk there is no faith:" 143

Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite
passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainity.
If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I
do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must
believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the.objective uncertainity,
so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand
fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.l44
And such was the task of the individual in religiousness B.

Kier-

kegaard felt that it was a task attainable and performable by all:
"First of all, everybody can become a Christian." 145
The existence spheres have been important to Kierkegaardi an
understanding.

He recapitualted the spheres so that the reader would

be able to see the task clearly before him.
Immediacy, the aesthetic, finds no contradiction in the
fact of existing:
to exist is one thing, and the contradiction is something else which comes from without. The
ethical finds the contradiction, but within self-assertion.
The religiousness A comprehends the contradiction as suffering
in self-annihilation, although within immanence, but by

142 carnell, op. cit., p. 86.
143

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 182.

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., p. 520.
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ethically accentuating the fact of existing it prevents the
exister from becoming abstract in immanence, or from becoming
abstract by wishing to remain in immanence. The paradoxical
religiousness breaks with immanence and makes the fact of
existing the absolute contradiction, not within immanence,
but against immanence. There is no 1onger any immanent fundamental kinship between the temporal and the eternal, because
the eternal itself has entered time and would constitute there
the kinship.l46

146 Ibid., pp. 507-508.

CHAPTER FOUR
TRUTH IS SUBJECTIVITY
The concept of abso 1ute paradox was centra 1 to Ki erkegaard' s
The counterpart to that theme was Ki erkegaard' s concept,

thought.

"truth is subjectivity."

This

phrase was not intended to imply that

there were not truths outside of the knower. 1 Rather, Kierkegaard was
concerned with religious truth (faith) and it was this truth that was
subjectivity.

Ki erkegaard wished to avoid any misconceptions that

would make of religious truth an object of empirical knowledge.

To

suggest such a thing would remove the existing individual from his
existential task, the appropriation of religious truth.
A.

Objective/Subjective

Kierkegaard felt that the best way to recognize the positive
was through the negative. 2 The objective therefore became the negative
mirror by which Kierkegaard could reflect the subjective.

It was

against objectivity that Kierkegaard reacted because of it's lack of
passionate inwardness.

The objective was thought of as out there,

1James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co. Inc., 1971), p. 320.
2

s~ren Kierkegaard,
[Johannes
Climacus], Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie
(Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1941), p. 474.
64.
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and was perceived without the interplay of feeling as opinion.

3

Kier-

kegaard's distaste for the objective lay not in the reality of objective fact but rather with the ease by which one may appropriate
the

objective

in

the

absence

objective was obvious all

of

any

personal

involvement.

The

around, but when objectivity replaced the

subjective in Christianity (a religion of faith) Kierkegaard's anger
was kindled.

Christianity was not an object for science to dissect

but was a religion of faith that demanded the existing individual
believe

against

his

understanding

and

exist

in

relation

to the

absolute paradox which required his full being.·
The absolute paradox or the incarnation was an objective fact.
Kierkegaard accepted this, but insisted that the objective remained
meaningless until

it impacted the individual.

individual's responsibility, for "the
cisely the decisive factor."

4

The impact was the

subjective acceptance is pre-

Kierkegaard's concern with the objective

rose out of his observation of Christendom in which man became dispassionate because of objectivity.

"Objective thinking does not care

at a 11 about the thinker and finally becomes so objective that, 1ike
the customs clerk,

it thinks that it merely has to do the writing,

that the others have to do the reading." 5

3E.J. Carnell, The Burden of S0ren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1965), p. 110.
4 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit. p. 116.
5Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, ed. trans., S0ren Ki erkegaard's Journals and Papers IV (Bloomington: Indiana Un1vers1ty
Press, 1975), p. 347.
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S.K.'s singular use of the term objective differed somewhat
with the contemporary usuage.

Objective, especially in the realm of

thought, was abstract, that is, it v1as ab 1e to be camp 1eted and was
about things in the world and not oneself.
caul d not

The subjective by contrast,

be camp 1eted but was a h-1ays becoming, true to its ex-

istential nature.

6

Kierkegaard illustrated the manner in which he

meant the word objective.
The existing individual who chooses to pursue the objective way enters upon the entire approximation-process by
which it is proposed to bring God to light objectively. But
this is in all eternity impossible, because God is a subject
and therefore exists only for subjectivity in inwardness.?
To be objective meant to be disinterested "infinitely, personally and
passionately," with that which happens to individuals. 8
Kierkegaard freely admitted that Christianity was based on
a series of objective historical events, 9

but

he

did

not

concede

Christianity to the objective.
It is subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with,
and it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if it
exists at all; objectively, Christianity has absolutely no
existence. If its truth happens to be in only a single subject, ·it exists in him alone; and there is greater Christian

6Groff and Mi 11 er , The Shaping of Modern Christi an Thought,
(Cleveland and New York: The World Pub. Co., 1968), p. 371.
7s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178.
8 rbid., pp. 23-24.
9 Ibid., pp. 508-512.
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joy in heaven over this one individual than over universal
history and the System, which as objective entities are incommensurable for that which is Christian.lO
Therefore, to validatethe historical data (through science,archaeology,
etc.) of Christianity was useless in establishing the essential truth
of Christianity.

A Christian was able to rest in the objectivity of

the historical facts and not mediate the truth of Christianity in the
self. 11 · He was able to live his life as usual and do nothing about
the objective facts, remaining unchanged in their presence.
The answer to this tranquil but meaningless mode of existence
was to come through the transformation of the existing individual.
The transformation

of the individual was contingent upon there-

orientation of the self in its relation to the truth. 12
When the question of truth is raised inan objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an
object to which the knower is related.
Reflection is not
focused upon the relationship, however, but upon the question
of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related.
If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the
subject is accounted to be in the truth.
When the question
of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed
subjectively to the nature of the individual 1 S relationship;
if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the
individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus
related to what is not true.l3
10 Ibid., p. 116.

11 carnell, op. cit., p. 116.

12

Kierkegaard felt the reason why man did not presently understand the 11 right 11 (subjective) concept of the truth was the fault of
speculative philosophy, the result of Hegelian systematic.
Speculative phi 1osophy and objectivity are used synonomously, the 1atter
describing the former. Thus, while speculative philosophy may technically be another category for the discussion of truth, a discussion
of the objective adequately addresses the issue.
See Postscript,
pp. 49-55.
13 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178.
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It was made clear by S.K. in the footnote for this

passage~

that the

truth he was speaking about was essential or eternal truth which was
"related to existence."

14

While objectivity failed for Kierkegaard because it did not
engage the individual passionately through
because it did not confront the absolute.
much~

formation, no matter how

15

it also failed

Objective, historical in-

could never come to an absolute cer-

tainty or provide irrefutable proof.
approximation and no more.

inwardness~

All it could do was come to an

The historian or objective thinker was

ab 1e to suggest Christianity as a prob 1em of thought but could not
address its
the

truths~

inwardness

of

for "Christianity on the contrary is subjective;
faith

in

the

believer constitutes the truth's

eternal decision . . . . Christianity is inwardness."
Ki erkegaard

16

felt that those who espoused objectivity as a

methodology by which one was to arrive at the (eternal) truth had confused knowledge with faith.
In this objectivity one tends to lose that infinite personal
interestedness in passion which is the condition of faith,
the ubi que et nusquam in which faith can come into being.
Has anyone who previously had faith gained anything with respect to its strength and power?
No~ not in the 1east.
Rather is it the case that in this voluminous knowledge~ this
certainty that 1urks at the door of faith and threatens to

14
15

16

Ibid.

s~ren Kierkegaard~ Postscript~
Ibid, p. 201.

op.

cit.~

p. 31.
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devour it, he is in so dangerous a situation that he will need
to put forth much effort in great fear and tremb 1i ng, 1est
he fall a victim to the temptation to confuse knowledge with
faith . . . . For if passion is eliminated, faith no longer
exists, and certainty and passion do not go together. Whoever
believes that there is a God and an over-ruling providence
finds it easier to preserve his faith easier to acquire something that definitely is faith and not an illusion, in an imperfect world where passion is kept alive, than in an
absolutely perfect world.
In such a world faith is in fact
unthinkable.l7
Objective reality, for the individual, was not to be desired.
Kierkegaard asked him simply to respond to the action required by
objective realities.

The proper response was not "What is this?" but
should be "What may I do about this?" 18 The objective did not pre-

determine what the action of the subjective should be.
entirely distinct.
taken.

The

The two are

objective merely required that action be

The subjective decided through passionate inwardness what that

action would be.
necessarily

Decision could only rise up out of freedom which

existed

in

the subjective only.
Objectivity became
. t 1. v1. t y. 19 Th e 1. nd.1v1. d ua 1 mus t become
sec on dary as a resu 1t t o su bJeC
aware of his freedom and his total responsibility for his own actions.
When the i ndi vi dua 1 possessed this awareness then he knew that the
objective had dropped off and that he was gripped with the decisiveness of subjectivity.

17 Ibid., p. 30.
18 Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard, A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 173.
19 Ibid.
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Becoming subjective suggested that one was on the way to the
discovery of truth.

The desire to enter subjectivity was to rise up

out of the individual's realization that one's illusion of selfsufficiency was entirely false.

The resultant despair caused the individual to become dependent upon God. 20
It is subjectivity that
Christianity is concerned with, and it is only in subjectivity that
its truth exists. 21
The question S.K. wished to confront in his "Concluding Unscientific Postscript " asked:

"How can eternal truth be appropriated
by one who exists and thinks in time?" 22 The first thing he rejected
as a solution was the Hegelian 23 resolution (synthesis) of the thesis
and antithesis.

The only answer was to become subjective in one's

search for the truth.

Because the individual was finite, he was not

able to conform his temporal existence to the eternal idea.

Kier-

kegaard felt, however, that the existing individual could appropriate

20 carnell, op. cit., p. 121.

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 116. S.K. also
argued with objectivity and its exponents concept of 1-am-I which proposed that man step outside of the self to discover through empirical
observation the objective reality of his being. Postscript, p. 176.
21

22 Mackey, op. cit., p. 180. This question was really formulated and addressed on one level in the Philosophical Fragments.
In the Postscript, S.K. continued the discussion carrying 1t deeper
into the life of the individual. He stated "The subjective problem
concerns the relationship of the individual to Christianity," wherein
is the truth (Postscript, p. 20). It is, of course, S.K.'s pseudonym
that addressed the problem (Johannes Climacus).
23 Hegelianism, speculative philosophy, objectivity, while all
i nter-re 1ated were the three enemies or detractors of the truth and
thus suffered the polemical attacks of S.K.
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the eterna 1 truth.

The constant striving for and dedication to the

eterna 1 truth a 11 owed the exi ster to 1i ve the ide a by a 11 owing the
idea to live within him.
could know.
to

be

There was to be no other truth that man

Moments of passion within the individual caused the truth

realized,

mentarily

24

that

thus;
the

"truth is subjectivity."
particular

individual

is

"It is only moable

to

realize

existentially a unity of the infinite and the finite which transcends
existence.
1.

This unity is realized in the moment of passion." 25

Passion
Passion for Kierkegaard was " . . . the highest expression of

subjectivity."

26

If an existing individual had passion he had removed

the stain of objectivity.

"In absolute passion the individual is in

the very extremity of his subjectivity, as a consequence of his having
reflected himself out of every external relativity."
the passion cannot be determined by a third party.

27

The

depth

of

He may "understand

him only generally with respect to the object of his passion, "

28

but

the third party cannot understand him in the absoluteness of his
passion.

24 Mackey, op. cit., p. 181.
25

26
27

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 176.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 454.

28 Ibid., p. 455.
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The experience of passion was not greater than the discovery
of eternal truth but was the expression of inwardness whereby eternal
truth could be realized.

"In passion the existing subject is rendered
infinite in the eternity of the imaginative representation," 29 and is

closest to the eternal truth for "God is a subject, and therefore
exists only for subjectivity in inwardness." 30 Man can only know the
truth through himself· where passion and inwardness must abound, for
"subjectively the truth exists for them [man] in inwardness, because
the decisiveness of the truth is rooted in the subjectivity of the
individual." 31
Subjectivity culminated in passion. Christianity was paradox.
"Paradox and passion are a mutual fit." 32 The question was not which
gave rise to the other, but: "what was the relationship between them?"
"The existing individual has by means of the paradox itself come to
be placed in the extremity of existence [passion]." 33 The relationship
between the two became more intensive through the inwardness of the
existing individual.

When passion became an expression of the eternal

the passion of the infinite was itself the truth.

29

By virtue of the

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178.

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 195.
32 Ibid., p. 206.
33 Ibid.
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passion involved; the truth could not be found objectively.
2.

Faith
While passion was an inward expression of the eternal truth,

Kierkegaard felt that one must move beyond passion.

Passion signified

the contradiction of ones existence, especially those felt emotionally
between freedom and nature within the self.
relationship with passion,
in thought.

34

Paradox, which was in

indicated the contradictions experienced

Truth was the re 1at ion between passionate inwardness

and paradox.
When subjectivity is truth, the conceptual determination
of the truth must include an expression for the antithesis
to objectivity, . . . this expression will at the same time
serve as an indication of the tension of the subjective inwardness. Here is such a definition of truth: An objective
uncertainity held fast in an appropriation-process of the most
passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual. At the point where the
way swings off . . . there objective knowledge is placed in
abeyance .
. The truth is precisely the venture which
chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the
infinite.35
Ki erkegaard
scription of faith.
truth.

converted

his

definition

of truth

As he had previously stated,

into a de-

subjectivity is

"By virtue of the relationship subsisting between the eternal

truth and the existing individual, the paradox came into being."

34 Mackey, op. cit., p. 181.
35 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 182.
36 Ibid., p. 187.

36

The
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paradox occurred when the eternal truth came into being in time.

When

the i ndi vi dua 1 is confronted with the truth as paradox then he is
"gripped in the anguish and pain of sin, facing the tremendous risk
of the objective insecurity, [then] the individual

believes.

But

without risk no faith. " 37
Kierkegaard believed there was a God but he was not knowable
through objective uncertainty.

Instead the existence of God was a

subjective certainty because of the absurdity; "and this absurdity,
held fast

in the passion of inwardness, is faith . . .

The absurd

is - that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has
come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth." 38
It was within and because of the absurdity that faith took
on an incredible sense.
understandable.

Faith was to believe in thatwhich Vv'as not

"For the absurd is the object of faith, and the only

object that can be believed." 39 Faith was in response to that which
was beyond the objective, thus Johannes De Silentio remarked that
"Faith is a miracle, and yet no man is excluded from it; for that in
which all human life is unified is passion, and faith is a passion." 40

37 Ibid., p.
188.
38 Ibid., p. 189.
39 Ibid.
40

s~ren Kierkegaard, [Johannes De Silentio], Fear and
Tremb 1i ng, trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City N.Y.: Doub 1eday Anchor
Books, 1954), p. 77.
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It was precisely at this point that passion was related to faith.
The "authentically human factor is passion . . . the highest passion
in man is faith."

41

Ki erkegaard defined faith in a subjective fashion: "Faith is:
that the self in being itself and in willing to be itse 1f is grounded
transparently in God. 1142
the expression of faith.

He also equated his definition of truth with
While truth was defined as "an objective

uncertainty held fast in an appropriation - process of the most pas-

.
.
dness. .. 43
s1onate
1nwar

"faith is precisely the

contradiction

between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the
objective uncertai nity. u 44
The existing individual was not able to verify the existence
of his faith through objective means.

Since faith was equated with

truth and truth was subjectivity, so was faith also subjective.

To

be able to verify one's own faith objectively required that one set
aside his subjectivity in order to gaze inward upon his own understanding of faith.

But the object of faith was the absurd, and since

the absurd could, by nature, not be understood he learned that he no

41 Ibid., p. 131.
42 s0ren Kierkegaard, [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death,
trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954)
p. 131.
Kierkegaard felt that in order to define anything related
to existence it must be defined subjectively. To offer an objective
definition is to actually do less for the subject than no definition
at a 11.

43 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 182.
44 Ibid.

76.
longer believed for he "almost knows, or as good as knows." 45
The character of

faith

suggested that the absurd was the

proper object for faith because the improbable requires belief while
objective reasoning could reject it.

"To believe against the under-

standing is something different, and to believe with the understanding
cannot be done at all." 46

The nature of faith was to be seen in it 1 S

activity.
Faith always gives thanks, is always in peril of life,
in this collision of finite and infinite which is precisely
a moral danger for him who is a composite of both. The probable is therefore so little to the taste of a believer that
he fears it most of all, since he well knows that when he
clings to 4robabilities it is because he is beginning to lose
his faith.
Kierkegaard again wished to elucidate the nature of Faith by
providing a description of its opposite or negative; sin.
But too often it has been overlooked that the opposite
of sin is not virtue, not by any manner of means. This is
in part a pagan view which is content with a merely human
measure and properly does not know what sin is, that all sin
is before God.
No, the opposite of sin is faith, as is
affirmed in Rom. 14:23, "whatsoever is not of faith is sin."
And for the whole of Christianity it is one of the most
decisive definitions that the opposite of sin is not virtue
but faith.48

45 Ibid., p. 189.
46 Ibid., p. 208.
47 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
48

s~ren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p. 213.
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This was the relationship between faith and sin.

Kierkegaard defined

sin as: "before God, or with the conception of God, to be in despair
at not wi 11 i ng to be oneself, or in despair at wi 11 i ng to be oneself."49

Faith was thought of as that condition of the self which

frees from despair, was able to cast off speculation and objectivity
to discover it's essence in the abso 1uteness of God.
condition of

faith

the

Through this

self became higher than the universal,

a

paradox. 5°
Faith is precisely this paradox, that the individual as
the particular is higher than the universal, is justified over
against it, is not subordinate but superior - yet in such a
way, be it observed, that it is the particular individual who,
after he has been subordinated as the particular to the
universal, now through the universal becomes the individual
who as the particular is superior to the universal, for the
fact that the individual as the particular stands in an
absolute relation to the absolute.51
As

has

been

stated,

Kierkegaard

had

no

quarrel

with the

universal (objectivity) so long as it remained within the appropriate
disciplines of formal

logic, mathematics etc. The polemical nature

of S.K. sprang forth when the objective/universal swallowed up reality
and

thus

reduced

the existing

individual

to

objective material.

"Truth is subjectivity" was denied and disinterestedness set in for

49 Ibid., p. 208.
50
51

carnell, op. cit., p. 126.

s~ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, op. cit., p. 66.
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the individual.
Faith, the type of which Abraham possessed, rejected the
universal in favor of living in relation to the absolute, for it was
in such a relation only that faith can survive and increase.

It was

precisely the risk of living in such a relation that caused faith to
increase. 52 It was the eternal character of "truth is subjectivity"
that caused faith to break away from finitude and express itself towards the abso 1ute paradox.

Abraham was ab 1e to take Isaac up upon

the mountain for a sacrifice because his faith was not limited tothe
universal but stood in relation to the absolute.
What a tremendous paradox faith is, a paradox which is capable
of transforming a murder into a holy act well-pleasing to God,
a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, which no thought
can master, because faith begins precisely there where
thinking leaves off.53
Abraham did not understand the reasons for taking such an action for
he knew that doing such a thing stood in opposition to the ethical.
But it was precisely at this point that faith could become active,
when the understanding had given way.

Abraham realized that God, the

absolute, had given the command and he had nothing to gain and everything to lose by a disputation with God.

"He knew that it was God

the Almighty who was trying him, he knew that it was the hardest
sacrifice that could be required of him; but he knew also that no

52 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 188.
53 s0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, op. cit., p. 64.
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sacrifice was too hard when God required it - and he drew the knife:• 54
Because of his willful submission of the self to the absolute, Abraham
was able to experience the peace of passionate, inward faith.
Since faith was a passion, the self committed everything to
the absoluteness of God.

The self will become more willing to trust

all, thus the more constant and productive faith became.

No longer

was he to be simply a member of a group or some superficial element
of the universa1. 55
Once the quality and the nature of faith was established, S.K.
began to outline the task of faith.

"Faith has in fact two ta-sks:

to take care in every moment to discover the improbable, the paradox;
and then to hold it fast with the passion of inwardness." 56 S.K. was
not concerned particularily with the final activities of the existing
individual that resulted in faith.

Rather, it was the decisiveness

of passionate inwardness, the affect that the passion of faith had
upon the individual.

The activity of the individual would be right

if the self was purified through faith.

The tasks of faith would in-

sure that the self would continue to be "becoming" and thus truth too
would be "becoming" subjectively.

54 Ibid., p. 36.
55 carnell, op. cit., p. 131.
56

s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 209.
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Not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject
is an existing individual, and that existence is a process
of becoming, and that therefore the notion of the truth as
identity of thought and being is a chimera of abstraction,
in its truth only an expectation of the creature; not because
the truth is not such an identity, but because the knower is
an existing individual for whom the truth cannot be such an
identity as long as he lives in time.57
The acquisition of faith was no small matter for it required
the surrender of

unde~standing.

The surrender came about through the

existential situation, the confrontation with the infinite in time.
To have faith one needed to first exist then "if you do not have
faith, then at least believe that you will indeed come to have faith
- and then you do have faith." 58
God presented the existing individual with the promise of eternal life (which he needed).

It was

the be 1i ever who could experience the eterna 1 hap pi ness promised. 59
'1t is precisely as a believer that he is infinitely interested in his
eternal happiness, and it is in faith that he is assured of it." 60
B.

Truth is Subjectivity: The Essence
What has thus far been discussed may be thought of as the

methodo 1ogy by which one may come to the truth.

Ki erkegaard thought

57 Ibid., p. 176.
58 Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., (1970) Vol. 2, p. 20.
59 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 20.
60 Ibid., p. 53.
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of the way by which one came to the truth as important as the arrival,
for the individual was constantly "becoming" along with the truth he
unwittingly possessed through his own subjectivity.

It was the task

of bringing the existing individual to that realization in which S.K.
was engaged.

But what was the essence of the concept: "truth is sub-

jectivity?"
"Whether truth is defined more empi rica lly, as the conformity
of thought and being, or more idealistically, as the conformity of
being with thought, it is, in either case, important carefully to note
what is meant by being."
ideal, essence etc.

61

Being was not to be thought of as the

that are of an objective form.

implied becoming, existence etc.:
of the subjective, existential.
[vaeren]

is an essential

Rather being

Thereby moving being into the realm
"Every qualification for which being

qualification lies outside of immanental

thought, consequently outside of logic." 62
Thought and being were not ab 1e to come to conformity in
reality.
As soon as the being which corresponds to the truth comes
to be empi rica lly concrete, the truth is put in process of
becoming, and is again by way of anticipation the conformity
of thought with being. This conformity is actually realized
for God, but it is not realized for any existin~ spirit, who
is himself existentially in process of becoming.6

61
62
63

Ibid., p. 169.
Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., (1967) Vol. 1, p. 80.

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 170.
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A11 existence was in the process of becoming.

Ki erkegaard regarded

"becoming" as part of his "subjective reflection" which also was an
empirical

approach.

That is, the empi rica 1 approach of persona 1

experience.
In

subjective reflection the truth became a question of
inwardness, of subjectivity. 64 "For a subjective reflection the truth
becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of

subjectivit~

and

thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his
65
subjectivity."
Objective reflection and subjective reflection were the two
options for the existing individual as to how one might regard the
truth.

Simply because of the fact that it was an existing individual

who posed such a question the objective was rejected for the objective
laid outside of existence.

The "subjective reflection turns its at-

tention inwardly to the subject, and desires in this intensification
of inwardness to realize the truth." 66
The truth was never fi na 1 and comp 1ete.
if the individual were able to transcend himself.

It would have been
The individual was

caught in time and was able to realize the eternal only momentarily
through a union of the infinite and the finite in a moment of passion.67

The individual was still in existence but had glimpsed the

64 Groff and Miller, op. cit., p. 371. S.K. also regarded objective thought as synonymous with abstract thought.
65 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 171.
66 Ibid., p. 175.
67 Ibid., p. 176.
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truth as potentiated through the passionate inwardness of the self.
11

lt is passion of the infinite that is the decisive factor

and not its content, for its content is precisely itself.

In this

manner subjectivity and the subjective how" constitute the truth. 1168
11

11

At its maximum this inward "how" is the passion of the infinite, and

the passion of the infinite is the truth.

But the passion of the

infinite is precisely subjectivity, and thus subjectivity becomes the
truth." 69
Because "subjectivity is truth," paradox became a reality for
truth objectively which in turn demonstrated that indeed subjectivity
is truth.

Ki erkegaard often used this technique of the negative to

bring about the affirmative and he used it to describe the paradoxical
character of truth.

"The paradoxical character of the truth is its

objective uncertainty:

this uncertainty is an expression for the

passionate inwardness,

and this passion is precisely the truth." 70

"The truth is a snare; you cannot get it without being caught yourself; you cannot get the truth by catching it yourself but only by
its catching you." 71

68 rbid.' p. 181.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 183.
71 Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 503.
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The paradoxical nature of truth was the result of man in time
whi 1e the truth was eterna 1.

It was a tension between the infinite

God was the abso 1ute paradox because of the incarnation and God was the eternal truth. 72 Man encountered the truth
and the finite.

through the subjective experience of faith, but God directly gave the
believer a full sense of certitude that he has encountered the truth.
11 God is the object of the truth, and the medi urn by which the truth

is known. 1173
S.K. thought it was ridiculous to attempt to observe one• s
way to God, the truth.

Natural theology brought one no closer to God

for God does not exist within his creation.

11 Nature is, indeed, the

work of God, but only the handiwork is. directly present, not God. 1174
In like manner, it was ridiculous to approach God through
theistic proofs.

11 TO attempt to think one•s way to God is the supreme

case of thoughtlessness.~~ 75
in nothing but paganism.

These sort of approaches to God result
The pagan thought he could approach God

without any inwardness or subjectivity and it was precisely here that
the truth lay.

72

s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 218.

73

Bernard Ramm, Varieties of Christian
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1961), p. 59.
74

Apologetic

s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 218.

75 Ramm, op. cit., p. 60.

(Grand
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God remained elusive, 11 precisely because He is the truth, and
by being e 1us i ve desires to keep man from error. 1176
to seek for God.

Man

was

forced

Whi 1e he sought for God he reflected upon the

reasons for such a search.

This reflection caused him to realize that

his own depravity was the barrier or the reason for God's elusiveness.

77

Once man has made this first admission or realization he has made his
first step of inwardness, for 11 God is a subject
only for subjectivity in

and therefore exists

inwardness.~~ 78

God was able to be known only by the individual 11 Stripped
naked 11 of all his previous thoughts and standing
isolation before God. 1179

11

precisely in his

It was not the community that brought the

truth, rather the individual found it through passionate inwardness
in isolation, apart from the community.

11

In order to become aware

of the truth it is necessary to have apartness ( 11 Chri st took him
aside 11 ) , apartness from the crowd.

And this alone is sufficient to

make a man anxious and more afraid than he is of

death.~~ 80

The individual who desired God, the truth, suffered great pain
because he realized the dialectical difficulty of such a task.

It

was at that very instant that he had God 11 by virtue of the i nfi ni te
passion of

76
77
78

79

inwardness.~~ 81

s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 218.
Ramm, op. cit., p. 60.
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 472.

80 Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 503.
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The paradoxical finite and the infinite, the incarnate Christ
the God/man, the eternal truth in time all made up "subjectivity is
truth."

Ki erkegaard rea 1i zed that man would never understand this,

and that was good for it drove man to God.

God, the absolute ideal,

could understand for "it is he who is outside of existence and yet
in existence, who is in eternity forever complete, and yet includes
all existence within himself- it is God." 82

82

Ibid., p. 108.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
A.

S0ren Kierkegaard:

The Father of Existentialism

The impact of S0ren Kierkegaard's philosophy was little felt
in his lifetime outside of his immediate influence in Copenhagen.
It wasn't until the very early years of the twentieth century that
Kierkegaard began to have his impact.
world

war

Europe. 1

that
Karl

Kierkegaard's

1t was directly after the first

philosophy became

known

throughout

Barth contributed largely to this interest in S.K.

through his incorporation of Kierkegaardian philosophy into his theological method.

When Barth dropped his "bombshell" commentary on

Romans in 1919 2 on the theological community, the movement commonly
known as Nee-orthodoxy was born and an interest in Kierkegaardian
thought was sparked. 3
The force with which S.K.'s thought hit the twentieth century
was obvious when one realized the influence Nee-orthodoxy had on this

1LivingstoR, James C., Modern Christian
Macmillan Pub. Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 311-312.

Thought

(New

York:

2Hordern, W. E., A Laymans Guide to Protestant Theo 1ogy (New
York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1955), p. 130.
3Tillich, Paul, A Complete History of Christian Thought (New
York: Harper & Row Pub., 1968), see pp. 172-173 for a short summary
of the thought relationship between S.K. and Karl Barth.
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century.

Some of the greatest contemporary theological thinkers were

part of this movement.

Such men as Barth,

Bonhoeffer,

Bultmann,

Rei nho 1d Niebuhr and others represented Neo-orthodoxy and were responsi b 1e for it's prominence in modern thought and 1ife.

Kier-

kegaard largely shaped the spirit and basic motifs of dialectical
theo 1ogy by which Barth and other Neo-orthodox theo 1ogi ans expressed
themselves and did their work.

Kierkegaardian dialectics became the

sine qua non of Neo-orthodoxy theology.
Kierkegaard
Existentialism."

4

has

been

regarded

as

the

"Father

Modern

Existentialism permeated German, French and other

European philosophies.

Ki erkegaard would have appreciated the fact

that existentialism first found expression in theology.
contemporary

of

existential

scene

has

used

existential

However, the
thought

atheistic secular philosophies as well as theological thought.
Heidegger largely secularized Kierkegaard's thought.
existentialists, Jean Paul Sartre

5

and

Camus,

in

Martin

The contemporary

popularized

existen-

tialism through their writings and novels which really resulted in
a philosophy of despair and meaninglessness, far from S.K. 's hopes
and

intentions.

existential

It

was

Kierkegaard's

intention

that

through

interpretation Christianity would become meaningful for

the believer.

Rohde, Peter, "S~ren Kierkegaard: The Father of Existentialism," Essays on Kierkegaard ed. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis:
Burgess Pub. Co., 1969), p. 29.
4

5
copleston, F.S.J. A History of Philosophy, Vol. 7, part II,
(Garden City: Image Books, 1965), pp. 207, 210.
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Kierkegaard's thought

has resulted

in both

positive and

negative effects in philosophy, theology and ultimately in life as
lived by the individual.

It would appear that much of what Ki er-

kegaard thought has been misinterpreted.

Certainly it has been

perverted from the original intent Kierkegaard had which was to bring
man into relationship with God; not to deny the essential existence
of God.

While Kierkegaard may be faulted for

some of the misinter-

pretation and perversion of his thought because of his insistent use
of indirect communication and obscurity, much of the fault falls at
the feet of those who would first deny God's existence and then come
to Kierkegaardian existentialism.

Kierkegaard made God his first

presupposition and moved forward from there.

If man did not find God

it was because he lacked the passionate inwardness by which God was
discovered subjectively. 6
as well as weakness.

Perhaps this was Kierkegaard's strength

We can say "yes" to some elements and "no" to

other elements of his thought.
B.

Yes
1.

Kierkegaard sought to return the individual to a position

of importance.

Hegelian systematics had placed society above the in-

dividual, thus reducing individual responsibility and making anonymity
in the world desirable.

6s0ren Kierkegaard, [Johannes
Climacus]
Concluding
Unscientific Postscript trans. D.F. Swenson and .W. Lowrie (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 485.
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S.K. saw only the individual and felt this was a primary
category.

The mass removed the uniqueness of the individual and thus

destroyed Christianity.
Why did I make such a great, great fuss about the category
of individuality?
Very simply, through this and by this
stands the cause of Christianity.?
Spiritual superiority sees only single individuals. Alas,
generally we human beings are sense-dominated - therefore,
as soon as there is a gathering of people, the impression
changes and we see an abstraction, the mass - and we become
changed.
But for God, the infinite spirit, all these millions who
have lived and are living do not form a mass - he sees only
single individuals.8
The group had become the primary category.

If there was to

be a reformation in category the individual had to become the primary
emphasis.

People do not become Christians simply by belonging to a

particular group.
priation

One can come to God only by a persona 1 appro-

of faith.

This would insure the individual's respon-

sibility for his own spiritual well being.

Christianity was not an

all inclusive cloak that covered up sin and swept the unbeliever under
its protection.

Rather, faith was a decisive act of the will, brought

to fruition through passionate inwardness.
Much of S.K. 's category of the

individual may be regarded

as positive, for it has swung the pendulum away from an easy, nominal

7

s~ren Kierkegaard, S~ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers
ed. and trans. H.V. & E.H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1970), Vol. 2, p. 399.
8Ibid., Vol. 1, (1967) p. 414.
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Christianity that made no difference in the life of the believer.
The

pendulum swung towards the responsible individual

decision by

which one becomes a Christian and lives as a Christian: a dramatic
transformation in the life of the believer.
2.

9

Kierkegaarddeveloped the response of faith as the neces-

sary or essential response of the believer.
the

He offered Abraham of

Old Testament as the prime example of faith and dubbed him the

"Knight of Faith."

The response of the believer prior to S.K. was

no response at a 11.

The church assumed the responsi bi 1i ty for the

individual, thereby making the individual response of faith completely
unnecessary.
Ki erkegaard was right in asserting that without a persona 1
response of faith, the individual is not in possession of true Christianity.

The real contribution of Kierkegaard at this point was his

insistance upon the existential nature of faith.
declared that faith without works is dead.

The book of James

Kierkegaard made it clear

that this was so.

Faith that lay outside of the individual ceased

to

faith

be

faith,

for

found

activities of the believer.

its

expression

through

the

life

Faith, to be regarded as faith, must be

part of the believers existential situation, else it is useless.
Faith, rather than virtue as stated by Kierkegaard, was indeed
the opposite of sin.
between

man

9

and

God.

Sin is the cause of the broken relationship
The

activities

of virtue, while good and

rt is true that Kierkegaard has been accused of swinging the
pendulum too far in favor of the individual. This question will be
addressed first under Yes item #3 - Truth is Subjectivity. It will
also be addressed underlmJ item #1 - Exaggerated individualism.
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commendable, are important in reconciling man to God.

Reconciliation

is possible only through faith for "by grace are you saved through
faith."

(Ephesians 2:8).
Because of his ins i stance in this regard Ki erkegaard wrested

the

legalistic notion that "virtue gains righteousness" from it's

moorings and set

decisive faith in it's place.

Kierkegaard pointed

out that the believer's response must be one of faith in order to be
a believer.
3.

One of Kiekegaard's major contributions to thought has

been in regard to his

primary thesis, "truth is subjectivity."

one may disagree with

some of

Kierkegaard's

conclusions,

While
he has

clearly pointed out the differences between the objective and subjective.
Kierkegaard is right when he emphasizes the subjective nature
of religious knowledge.

While we may not go all the way with Kier-

kegaard, we must understand that there is a place in our understanding
of God where objective knowledge drops off and subjective faith brings
one into relationship with God.
feel
in

Contemporary Christianity seems to

an obligation to defend the elements of faith in Christianity
an

objective

fashion

to

a society which worships science and

deplores the paradoxical, the mysterious. However, as S.K. has so ably
pointed out, the objective proof for God's existence can only end in
approximation.

The

final

step must be subjective through faith.

Therefore, at least in this sense, truth is subjectivity.
Because, for Kierkegaard, truth is subjectivity, he has been

93.
accused of leading theology into radical subjectivity and advocating
irrationalism.

That Kierkegaard's position can lead to these things

is absolutely true.
doubtful.

In

Book

That Kierkegaard himself was guilty of these is
One

of the

Postscript

S.K.

religious truth can be known objectively but that
adequate.

made

clear that

it is totally in-

True Christianity moves much further, demanding that the

believer appropriate the truths for himself and live in relation to
those truths.
Kierkegaard

does

have

irrational

elements in his thought.

However, this is not because of his dislike for reason.

He was fully

aware of the capabi 1iti es of human reason and appreciated reason's
abilities.

His concern was with the 1imits of human reason.

The

pretentions of the rationalists caused him to be aware of the limits
of reason and the need to avoid the pride of i nte 11 ect.

Rea 1 under-

standing is that which understands there are things in the world that
defy

rational

explanation.

Paradox exists only for the existing

individual, but in God "the eternal essential truth is by no means
in itself a paradox."
C.

10

No

1.

While one of the great contributions of Kierkegaard was

the emphasis upon the individual in the face of the mass, an exaggerated individualism began to emerge.

10

The individual was a solitary

s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 183.
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individual who was to stand alone before God.
This individualism is too extreme for it does not take into
account the doctrine of the church, the uni versa 1 priest hood of a 11
believers etc.

One reads Kierkegaard in vain to discover any dis-

cussion of corporate worship, Christian fellowship, discipleship of
the new believer by the body, or the Church as the body of Christ as
described in Ephesians.
creature.

As Ki erkegaard admitted, man is a soci a 1

Instead of isolating oneself, involvement with others is

the Christian ideal.

One need not become part of the mass to involve

himself with others.

Individualism may be maintained despite the

efforts of the mass because one is in true relationship with God.
The fulfillment of Matthew 28:19-20 cannot come about in isolation.
Exaggerated individualism also altered S.K. 's perception of
While he did accept some objective reality it was always

reality.

inferior to subjective reality.

The unimportance of objective reality

resulted

in the symbolic Christianity of Schwietzer, Bultmann and

others.

Subjective reality must be dependent upon the foundation of

objective rea 1i ty.

If this is not so then Christ's death upon the

cross need not have really happened so long as we have the symbol of
his

death

within

Christian

theology

-

a

house

does

not

need

a

foundation so 1ong as we have the symbo 1 of a foundation within our
being.
Kierkegaard's

inwardness

distorted

reality

by causing the

elements of reality to be stretched out of proportion.
reflections

upon

even

the

most

minuscule

S.K. 's inward

reactions

of

Regine
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frequently resulted in unrealistic assumptions concerning motives and
intentions.

The reality that is only inward is inadequate.

The

subjective and objective should serve each other, establishing a
creative tension between the two, resulting in a balanced perception
or reality.

Reality becomes existentially meaningful but is not dis-

torted beyond recognition.
2.

Kierkegaard's ethical theory suggested a teleological sus-

pension of the ethical as the "Knight of faith's" response to the
absolute or God. Teleological suspension of the ethical was intended
to accentuate the abso 1uteness of God but instead reduced God the
absolute, to god the relative.
Ki erkegaard regarded Abraham as the true "Knight of faith."
When Abraham willingly intended to kill his own son, he was acting
in

what

ethi ca 1."

Kierkegaard

called the

"teleological

suspension

of the

However, if God is abso 1ute as Ki erkegaard admitted, then

God is also perfect.

He established his ethical laws as the ethical

absolute by which to govern man.

While God may be above his own law,

his law is not inadequate for man, for he does not create or establish
inadequate things, only man's willful perversion can destroy the perfect.

Therefore, for God to suspend His own ethical laws demandsthat

God admit to His own inadequacy and renege on his established law and
temporarily estab 1ish a new 1aw dependent upon the human, tempera 1
situation.

Therefore God was

subservient to His own creation, and

even the absolute became relative.
Teleological suspension of the ethical has left the door open
for situation ethics.

All the standards by which one measures the
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rightness or wrongness are relative.

As Kierkegaard suggested, one

may be in the truth and yet be related to an untruth.

In this sort

of ethi ca 1 re 1at i vity one is not so concerned with the what of a
decision but rather the how of a decision.

Did the decision to do

a particular thing come about through passionate inwardness involving
the whole being? - if so, then one is in the truth.
While one should be existentially involved with a decision,
the

subjective

process

of decision should be consistent with the

objective reality of the decision to determine the wrong or right.
When an ethical

law or absolute is violated then situation alone

determines the ethical decision governed by a relative interpretation
of the law of love.
3.

Kierkegaard had manybrilliant insights on the subject of

faith, already alluded to.
adequate relation

betw~en

Christian religion.

However, he was content with a most in-

faith and objective/public evidences for the

He asserted that faith is based on risks and the

more risks the more faith one is exercising.

Faith is therefore

founded not in the objective reality of the object of faith - God, but
instead desires to heighten the risk or absurdity of the object of
faith, - God, who is the absolute paradox.
If we use this reasoning then the imagination can surely conjure something up besides the absolute paradox, the incarnation, which
demands more risk.

Perhaps we should assert that Christ possessed two

heads and flew airplanes.

This would indeed increase the absurdity

and thus the risk of faith, but it is preposterous and is unbelievable
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because it is contrary to the sufficiency of the evidences.
The Christi an may respond passionately with faith regarding
the e 1ement of Christianity but this does not raise the sense of
certainty.

The Christian should believe passionately but the belief

is founded in the sufficiency of the evidences for the Christi an
faith.

The act of living a Christian life is existential proof that

one is experiencing a state of certainty.

The passion of faith is

the result of observing the sufficiency of the evidences and the
object of faith.
Fortunately Kierkegaard has contributed much more to the life
of faith than he has detracted from it.

He has called man to a type

of existence that few have the courage upon which to embark.

Ki er-

kegaard knew that the easy was not worth having.
Ki erkegaard was a genius in his ability to bring man
closer to God, and God closer to man. His guiding rule was
that an absolute devotion should be given to an absolute
telos, and a relative devotion to a relative telos. With the
help of this rule, Kierkegaard succeeded in defining an
existential approach to the existing individual.
This
approach is exciting, to say the least.ll

11 carnell, E.J., The Burden of S0ren Kierkegard (Grand Rapids:
1965) ' p. 172.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
A.

PRIMARY SOURCES - WORKS IN ENGLISH

Kierkegaard, S0ren. Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter, ed. and
trans. H.V. and E.H. Hong. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1968.
.

--~B~e-a-con

Attack upon Christendom, trans. W. Lowrie. Boston: The
Press, 1956.

.

Christi an Discourses: The Li 1i es of the Fie 1d and the
of the Air and Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays,
trans. W. Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1939.

--~B~i-r~ds

, [Vigilus Haufniensis]. The Concept Of Anxiety: A Simple
----.P'""s-y-chologically Orienting Deliberation On The Dogmatic Issue Of
Hereditary Sin, ed. and trans. Reidar Thomte with Albert B.
Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
,

[Vigilius Haufniensis]. The Concept Of Dread: A Simple
deliberation oriented in the direction of the
dogmatic problem of original sin, Second edition. trans. W.
Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957 .

----p~s-y~chological

. The Concept of Irony, trans. L.M. Capel, New York: Harper

--~a-n~d-'Row,

1965.

, [Johannes Climacus]. Concluding Unscientific Postscript To
Fragments: A mimic - Pathetic - Dialectic Compostlon: An Existential Contribution, trans. D.F. Swenson and
W. Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press for AmericanScandinavian Foundation, 1941.

--~T~h-e-Philosophical

, [Interet Inter]. Crisis in the Life of an Actress and Other
on Drama, trans. Stephen Crites. New York: Harper and Row,

---,E~s-s-ays

1967 .
--~L-.~M~.

.

Edifying Discourses, Vols. I-IV, trans. D.F. Swenson and
Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1943-46.

, [Victor Eremita]. Either/Or, I, trans. D.F. Swenson and L.M.
II, trans. W. Lowrie; 2nd. ed. rev. H.A. Johnson. Garden
City: Anchor Books, 1959.

--~s~w-e-nson;

98.

99.
, [Johannes De Silentio] Fear and Trembling: A dialectical
{with The Sickness Unto Death). trans. W. Lowr1e.
Garden
City: Anchor Books, 1954 .

---,c-y-r~ic

. For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourselves! including
-----..,r.--w:-:-o- Discourses at the Communi on on Fridays and The Unchangeableness of God, (trans. D.F. Swenson), trans. W. Lowne.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944 .
. The Gospel of Suffering and The Lilies of the Field, trans.
----,.0..---."i=F-. Swenson and L.M. Swenson. Minneapolis: Augusburg Publishing
House, 1948.
A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. Robert Bretall. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1946 .
.

--~S~e-r-mon,

Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est, and A
trans. T.H. Croxall, London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958~

. The Journals of S0ren Kierkegaard, ed. and trans .. A. Dru.
Oxford University Press, 1938.

--~c-o-n~don:

.

--~s~m~i't'h.

The Last Years: Journals 1853-1855, ed. and trans. R.G.
New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

. On Authority and Reve 1ati on, The Book on Adler, trans. W.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.

---.c~o-w-rie.

.

Parab 1es of Ki erkegaard, ed. Thomas C. Oden. Princeton:
University Press, 1978.

--~P~r~i-nceton

, [Johannes Climacus]. Philosophical Fragments: Or A Fragment
--o-..f,..-,..,Philosophy, trans. O.F. Swenson, trans. rev. and commentary
trans. by H.V. Hong, Intro. and commentary by Niels Thulstrup.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
. The Point Of View For My Work As An Author: A report to
--_,h_,i_s..,tory and related writings, ed. Benjamin Nelson, trans. W.
Lowrie. New York: Torchbooks, 1962.
. The Present Age [part of Two Ages: The Age of Revo 1uti on
____a_n_,dr- the Present Age. A Literary Review] and two Minor Ethi coReligious Treatises, trans. A. Dru, W. Lowrie. London: Oxford
University Press, 1940.
. Purity of the Heart is to wi 11 one thing: Spi ritua 1 pre___p_a_r-ation for the office of confession, trans. O.V. Steere. New
York: Torchbooks, 1948.
,

[Constantin Constantius]. Repetition,
Princeton University Press, 1941.

----,.P..-r~i-nceton:

trans.

W.

Lowrie.

100.

,

[Anti-Climacus]. The Sickness Unto Death (with Fear and
trans. W. Lowrie. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1954.

----r~r-e-mbling),

,
--~c-o-w-rie.

[Hilarius Bogbinder]. Stages on Life•s Way,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940.

trans.

W.

. S¢ren Kierkegaard•s Journals and Papers. Vols. I-VI. ed.
____a_n_,d-trans. H.V. and E.R. Hong. Bloom1ngton: Indiana University
Press, 1967-1978.
. Thoughts and Crucial Situations in Human Life, trans. D.F.
-----.s.-w-e-nson, ed. L.M.. Swenson.
Minneapolis: Augusburg Publishing
House, 1941.
, [Anti-climacus]. Training in Christianity, including The
Who Was A Sinner, trans. W. Lowrie. London: Oxford
University Press, 1941 .

--~w~o-m-an

.

--~H~a-r-per

Works of Love, trans. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong. New York:
and Row, 1962.

B.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Allen, E.I. From Plato to Nietzsche. New York: Fawcett Publications,
Inc., 19
Bromiley, Geoffrej W. Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth.
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979.
Brown, Colin. Philosophy and the Christian Faith: A historical sketch
from the middle ages to the present day. Chicago: Inter-Varsity
Press, 1969.
Busch, Eberhard. Karl Barth: His 1i fe from 1etters and autobiographical texts. 2nd. ed. trans. John Bowden. Ph1ladelph1a:
Fortress Press, 1976.
Co 11 ins, James.
1954.

The Mind of Ki erkegaard. London: Seeker and Warburg,

Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy: Schopenhauer to Nietzsche. Vol.
VII, Part II. Garden City: Image Books, 1965.
Duncan, Elmer H. S¢ren Ki erkegaard, ed. Bob E. Patterson. Makers of
the Modern Tehological Mind series. Waco: Word Books, 1976.
Ferm, Vergilius ed. History of Philosophical Systems. Totowa N.J.:
Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1950.

101.
Fletcher, Joseph. Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1966.
Geisler, Norman L. Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1976.
Geismar, Eduard. Lectures on the Re 1i gi ous Thought of S~ren Ki erkegaard: Given at Princeton Theological Seminary in March, 1936,
on the Stone Foundation. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House,

1937.

Gill, Jerry H. ed. Essays On Kierkegaard.
Publishing Co., 196 .

Minneapolis:

Burgess

Gonzalez, Justo L. A History of Christian Thought: From the Protestant
Reformation to the Twentieth Century. Vo 1. II I. Nashvi 11 e:
Abingdon Press, 1975.
Groff, Warren E., and Donald E. Miller. The Shaping of Modern Christain Thought. Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1968.
Hordern, Willam E. A Layman•s Guide to Protestant Theology. rev. ed.
New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1968.
Livingston, James C. Modern Christian Thought: From the Enlightenment
to Vatican II. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1971.
Lowrie, Walter.
.

Kierkegaard. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.

A Short Life of Kierkegaard.
Press, 1970.

--~u~n~,-versity

Princeton:

Princeton

Mackey, Louis. Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
Malantschuk Gregor. Kierkegaard•s Thought. ed. and trans. H.V. Hong
and E.H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
Neve, J.L. and O.W. Heick. A History of Christian Thought. Vol. II.
Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1946.
Niebuhr, H. Richard.
Books, 1951 •

Christ and Culture. New York: Harper Colophon

Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol. I. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946.
Ramm, Bernard.
Varieties of Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1961.

102.

Shestov, Lev. Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy.
Elinor Hewitt. Athens Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1969.
Sontag, Frederick.
1979.

trans.

A Kierkegaard Handbook. Atlanta: John Knox Press,

Sponheim, Paul. Ki erkegaard on Christ and Christi an Coherence. Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968.
Swenson, David F. Something About Ki erkegaard. Mi nneapo 1s: Augsburg
Publishing House,1941.
Tillich, Paul. A Complete History of Christian Thought. ed. Carl E.
Braaten, Part I and II. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968.

C.

JOURNALS

Kelly, Charles J. "Essential Thinking in Kierkegaard•s Critique of
Proofs for the Existence of God." The Journal of Religion, Vol.
59 #2 (April, 1979), 133-53.

D.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Sack, Nobel V.
"The Eschatology of Some Nee-Supernaturalists." ThO
dissertation, Northern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1957.

